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1. INTRODUCTION 
On March 11, 2009, nine families filed suit against the State of 
Minnesota, arguing that the state, after collecting blood samples from 
newborns for routine screening, unlawfully retained the samples in-
definitely and shared the samples with private research institutions 
and hospitals - all without parental knowledge or consent. I A day 
later, parents in Texas filed a lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the 
Western District of Texas, alleging similar conduct by Texas officials 
and arguing that retaining and using newborn blood without parental 
knowledge or consent violates the U.S. and Texas Constitutions.2 In 
both of these cases, families objected to the unconsented-to use of 
human tissue for unidentified research purposes, including genetic 
research. Meanwhile, on May 12,2009, the American Civil Liberties 
Union filed suit against the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office 
("USPTO") and Myriad Genetics, seeking to invalidate patents Myr-
iad holds for two genes responsible for most hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancers? 
These are only a few of the most recent cases to raise claims re-
garding the appropriate regulation of genetic research and its results.4 
As genetic and other research involving human cells progress, similar 
cases - especially those addressing the nature of the rights retained 
by those providing the tissue used in research - are likely to arise.5 
Through genetic analysis, researchers hope to identify disease-related 
and other genes and to measure the frequency of such genes' occur-
rence across large populations. This kind of research requires popula-
tion-wide bio-repositories of samples available for study. Already, 
I. Complaint, Bearder v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-09-5615 (Hennepin County, Minn., 
Dist. Ct. Mar. 11,2009). 
2. Complaint, Beleno v. Tex. Dept. of State Health Servs., No. SA09CAOl88 (W.D. Tex. 
Mar. 12,2009). 
3. Complaint, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 
09CV4515 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,2009). 
4. The USPTO, of course, does not directly regulate research; it issues patents and regis-
ters trademarks. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, Our Business: An Introduction to the 
USPTO, http://www.uspto.gov/web/menuJintro.html(last visited Dec. 20, 2009). In issuing 
patents, however, the USPTO has enabled others in some instances to control research and 
testing. More than a quarter of laboratory directors have reported receiving letters "ordering 
them to stop carrying out clinical tests designed to spot early warning signs" for a whole 
host of medical conditions - all based on exclusive licenses made possible by genetic-
sequence patenting. Julian Borger, Rush to Patent Genes Stalls Cures for Disease, 
GUARDIAN (London), Dec. 15, 1999, at I. 
5. The last few years have seen several prominent decisions regarding the rights of tissue 
providers. See, e.g., Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (recognizing Washington University as the exclusive owner of tis-
sues provided by patients seeing a urological specialist, Dr. Catalona, at the University); 
Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (reinstating 
claims by the Havasupai Tribe that the University of Arizona inappropriately used tissue 
donated by tribal members in unrelated and unconsented-to research). 
No.1] Human Tissue Research 121 
more than 300 million tissue samples from more than 178 million in-
dividuals are stored in the United States, and this number has been 
growing by more than 20 million samples every year.6 
Yet, as these and other recent cases suggest, individuals providing 
tissue for research may hesitate to do so if they fear that their interests 
will not be respected.7 Tissue providers may have concerns that their 
cells and genetic material - materials with which they may strongly 
self-identify - will be used for research they find morally repugnant 
or about which they were not informed. Unanticipated disclosure of 
genetic information may negatively impact the ability of unwitting 
tissue providers and their close genetic relatives to obtain insurance 
coverage or appropriate medical treatment.8 And tissue providers may 
have strong interests concerning the commercialization of their cells 
and genetic material, especially if they are not permitted to share in 
the profits.9 
Researchers and society at large also have strong interests in how 
tissue is used in research. 1O Scientific research using human cells can 
be (and has been) immensely beneficial. ll Inappropriate or onerous 
restrictions on human tissue research may negatively impact the pro-
gress of science and medicine. This concern has been clearly articu-
lated by several courts that have faced the issue of balancing the 
interests of tissue providers and the interests of researchers in ongoing 
research. For instance, the district court in Washington University v. 
Catalona,12 which recognized Washington University as the exclusive 
owner of disputed tissues, worried that "[ m ]edical research can only 
advance if access to these materials to the scientific community is not 
thwarted by private agendas.,,13 In Moore v. Regents of the University 
of California,14 the California Supreme Court similarly opined that 
6. ELISA EISEMAN & SUSANNE B. HAGA, HANDBOOK OF HUMAN TISSUE SOURCES, at 
xvii (\999). The National Bioethics Advisory Commission ("NBAC") similarly reported 
that "as of 1998, more than 282 million specimens of human biological materials were 
stored in the United States, accumulating at a rate of more than 20 million cases per year." 
NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, I RESEARCH INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL 
MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE 13 (1999). 
7. See infra Part II.A. 
8. See, e.g., Susannah Baruch, Your Genes Aren't Coveredfor That, SCI. PROGRESS, June 
29, 2009, http://www.scienceprogress.org/2009106/gina-challenges/ (identifYing gaps in 
protection persisting even after adoption of the Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act 
of2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881). 
9. Where individuals knowingly provide tissue for research, they also presumably have 
an interest in that research taking place - an interest in the progress of science. See infra 
Part n.A.4. 
10. See infra Part II.B. 
II. For an overview of the importance of human biological materials for medical re-
search, see NAT'L BIOETH1CS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 19-24. 
12.437 F. Supp. 2d 985 (E.D. Mo. 2006), affd, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007), cert de-
nied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008). 
13.Id. at 1002. 
14.793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990). 
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recognizing a property right in one's cells would have a chilling effect 
on socially beneficial medical research. 15 Moreover, permitting tissue 
providers to commercialize their cells may divert tissue from worth-
while research,16 diminish the necessary incentives for research fun-
ders to invest in research and development,17 and undermine societal 
dignitary interests. 18 
The interests of tissue providers, of researchers, and of broader 
society each demand respect and protection. Failing to mediate ten-
sions between these constituencies "may dissuade patients from par-
ticipating in medical research studies and slow progress in medical 
research.,,19 
This Article makes three contributions to the existing literature. 
First, in Part II, it provides a systematic account of the interests that 
tissue providers may have regarding the use of their tissue in research. 
Existing literature often speaks to one or some of these interests,20 and 
it generally does so in piecemeal fashion. This Article instead estab-
lishes a four-part system of provider interests at the outset. This sys-
15.Id. at 493 (emphasizing the need not to threaten "innocent parties who are engaged in 
socially useful activities" with "disabling civil liability"). 
16. Thomas P. Dillon, Comment, Source Compensation for Tissues and Cells Used in 
Biotechnical Research: Why a Source Shouldn't Share in the Profits, 64 NOTRE DAME L. 
REV. 628,634 (1989) ("If society allows individuals to sell their body parts, this process of 
shopping around will likely increase delays, force competitive bidding, and result in the 
inefficient use of resources."); see also Brian Su, Comment, Developing Biobanking Policy 
with an Oliver Twist: Addressing the Needs of Orphan and Neglected Diseases, 66 LA. L. 
REv. 771, 780 (2006) ("[Clommercial biobanks will, by necessity of both market opportuni-
ties and restraints, focus their studies on diseases afilicting relatively large, afiluent popula-
tions to realize a profit or at least recoup research expenditures."). 
17. See Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998) (explaining that people may 
underuse scarce resources because too many owners can block each other, and describing 
how the proliferation of overlapping rights holders in biomedical research has generated this 
anticommons scenario). But see Russell Korobkin, Buying and Selling Human Tissues for 
Stem Cell Research, 49 ARIZ. L. REV. 45,61 (2007) (arguing that commercial "tissue dona-
tions" will not substantially increase the cost of medical research in ways that inhibit its 
progress). 
18. Moore, 793 P.2d at 497-98 (Arabian, J., concurring) (asserting that "recogniz[ing] 
and enforc[ing] a right to sell one's own body tissue for profit" would cause us "to regard 
the human vessel- the single most venerated and protected subject in any civilized soci-
ety - as equal with the basest commercial commodity" and would "commingle the sacred 
with the profane"). Of course, researchers can, and do, commercialize people's cells and 
tissues - this is precisely what the researchers in Moore did. See id. at 481-83 (majority 
opinion). 
19. Ted T. Ashburn, Sharon K. Wilson & Barry 1. Eisenstein, Human Tissue Research in 
the Genomic Era of Medicine, 160 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MEO. 3377, 3381 (2000). 
20. See, e.g., Lori B. Andrews, Harnessing the Benefits of Biobanks, 33 1.L. MEO. & 
ETHICS 22 (2005) (describing provider interests in control and commercialization); Ashburn 
et aI., supra note 19 (identifying "confidentiality, consent, and compensation" as three core 
issues in human tissue research); Ellen Wright Clayton et aI., Informed Consent for Genetic 
Research on Stored Tissue Samples, 274 lAMA 1786 (1995) (discussing interests in consent 
and confidentiality generally). I have discussed several of these interests in other work. See 
Natalie Ram, Tiered Consent and the Tyranny of Choice, 48 lURlMETRICS 1. 253, 256-59 
(2008). 
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tem of interests, alongside a similar explication of researcher interests 
and interests of society at large, guides the analysis that follows. 
Second, in Part III, the Article draws on intellectual property rules 
to suggest a model of legal rights to frame interactions between tissue 
providers and researchers: "informational property," a right to one's 
own genetic information?l The Article considers, but finds incom-
plete and unpersuasive, existing proposals that focus on reforming the 
federal regulations governing federally-funded human subjects re-
search,22 strengthening contract rights for tissue providers,23 or un-
covering personal property rights in human tissue.24 Instead, the 
Article argues that a system of informational property rights that at-
tach to the most valuable and sought-after "stuff' in human tissue-
DNA - will best serve the various interests at stake in human tissue 
research. 
Third, the Article explores in some detail how the informational 
property model can best be implemented to produce an efficient and 
equitable system of legal rights for human tissue research. In Part III, 
it draws on literature engaging both open-source intellectual property 
and its digital rights management counterpart to suggest a sophisti-
cated system of licenses for human tissue research. In Part IV, the 
Article develops a multi-model theory about how best to construct 
future tissue provider-researcher interactions and disputes. It advo-
cates an informational property approach modeled on Creative Com-
mons licensing, reinforced by enhanced privacy protections in tort. 
21. The language of information as property has considerable pedigree. See sources cited 
infra note 124. 
22. The relevant regulations can be found at 45 C.F.R. § 46 (2007). For literature propos-
ing changes to these regulations, see Ashburn et a\., supra note 19, at 3381-82, which pro-
posed an infrastructure of tissue trustees; Henry T. Greely, Breaking the Stalemate: A 
Prospective Regulatory Framework for Unforeseen Research Uses of Human Tissue Sam-
ples and Health Information, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 737, 738 (I 999), which proposed "a 
framework for regulating unforeseen research uses of human biological materials and health 
information"; Kevin L.J. Oberdorfer, Note, The Lessons of Greenberg: Informed Consent 
and the Protection of Tissue Sources' Research Interests, 93 GEO. L.J. 365, 386-89 (2004); 
and Robert F. Weir, The Ongoing Debate About Stored Tissue Samples, in 2 RESEARCH 
INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERlALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, F-
1, F-18 (2000). Some well-known articles even argue that sufficient protection for tissue 
providers can be found within the existing regulations. See Clayton et a\., supra note 20. 
23. See, e.g., Oberdorfer, supra note 22, at 389-93. Few articles endorse a contract ap-
proach outright, as effective contracting depends on the existence of some type of property 
right with which to bargain. 
24. See, e.g., Donna M. Gitter, Ownership of Human Tissue: A Proposal for Federal 
Recognition of Human Research Participants' Property Rights in Their Biological Material, 
61 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 257, 338-39 (2004); MaryJoy Ballantyne, Note, One Man's Trash 
is Another Man's Treasure: Increasing Patient Autonomy Through a Limited Self-
Intellectual Property Right, 3 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL'y 567,583-96 (2005); Laura M. Ivey, 
Comment, Moore v. Regents of the University of California: Insufficient Protection of Pa-
tients'Rights in the Biotechnological Market, 25 GA. L. REV. 489, 533 (1991). Although 
Ballantyne refers to a "limited self-intellectual property right," her discussion contains 
mostly language in the traditional property framework. See Ballantyne, supra at 587-88. 
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II. THE INTERESTS AT STAKE 
Judith Resnik has remarked in another context that "[t]heories of 
remedies require theories of harm - about who is injured by what set 
of behaviors, imposed by individuals or entities that ought to be sub-
jected to sanctions or alter practices.,,25 In much the same way, only 
with a clear understanding of whose injuries should matter and what 
should constitute an injury can we then approach the question of what 
legal structure best meets our needs. Issues of control and ownership 
of bodies and their parts are the source of profound modern contro-
versy. For instance, regulations limiting the ability of individuals to 
direct the use of their transplantable organs, and those forbidding the 
buying and selling of such organs, have been both attacked as bad 
policy and potentially even unconstitutional deprivations of liberti6 
and defended as essential bulwarks against commodification that 
would undermine human dignity and jeopardize human flourishing?? 
Similar issues pervade human tissue research.28 What's more, tissue 
providers have additional cause for concern, as issues of genetic self-
identification, confidentiality, and personal medical benefit compli-
. fl' 29 cate our accountmg 0 re evant mterests. 
This Part first identifies and discusses the interests of tissue pro-
viders in control over the uses to which their tissue is put, the confi-
dentiality of the information contained in their cells, the 
commercialization or non-commercialization of products derived 
from their cells, and the ability to benefit personally from tissue re-
25. Judith Resnik, The Rights of Remedies: Collective Accountings for and Insuring 
Against the Harms of Sexual Harassment, in DIRECTIONS IN SEXUAL HARASSMENT LAW 
247,250 (Catherine A. MacKinnon & Reva B. Siegel eds., 2004). 
26. See, e.g., Charles A. Erin & John Harris, An Ethical Market in Human Organs, 29 J. 
MED. ETHICS 137 (2003) (attacking the current ban on organ sales and advocating an ethi-
cally regulated organ market); Eugene Volokb, Medical Self-Defense, Prohibited Experi-
mental Therapies, and Payment for Organs, 120 HARV. L. REv. 1813 (2007) (arguing that 
laws/regulations prohibiting sale of human organs violate a constitutional right to medical 
self-defense). 
27. See generally Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REv. 1849, 
1854-55 & n.23 (1987) (arguing that commodification of things important to personhood 
undermines human dignity and relationships). 
28. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 47 (arguing that "purchasing tissues for biomedical 
research should be both legal and socially acceptable"). But see Pilar N. Ossorio, Property 
Rights and Human Bodies, in WHO OWNS LIFE? 223, 238-39 (David Magnus, Arthur 
Caplan & Glenn McGee eds., 2002) (describing a possible, but not necessarily inevitable, 
slippery slope from applying market values to embryos to applying those values to embryo 
progenitors and children); Korobkin, supra note 17, at 47 (recognizing "nearly unanimous 
opinion in the medical research and public policy communities that tissue donors should be 
subject to a no-compensation rule"); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 
P.2d 479, 497 (Cal. 1990) (Arabian, J., concurring) (asserting that "recogniz[ing] and en-
forc[ing] a right to sell one's own body tissue for profit" would "commingle the sacred with 
the profane"). 
29. See infra Parts II.A.I-4. 
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search using their cells.3o This Part then offers countervailing ac-
counts of society's broader interests in the progress of science and 
medicine and researchers' interests in the lucrative commercialization 
of products and tools derived in conjunction with and resulting from 
such research. The interests of all of these parties are often mutually 
reinforcing, such that creating a system in which potential tissue pro-
viders feel confident that their interests are respected is likely to en-
courage such individuals to provide tissue for research purposes. 
A. The Interests of Tissue Providers 
1. Control 
The right to decide whether and how one's body and its parts may 
be used in research has been described as a "fundamental" right,3l 
although courts have yet to recognize such strong protection for pro-
viders of human tissue for research. Respect for the interests of tissue 
providers in controlling the ways in which their tissues, and the in-
formation contained in their cells, are used flows in part from respect 
for human dignity. Human dignity demands that all persons be treated 
not merely as means to an end, but also as ends in themselves.32 When 
individuals are made tissue providers without their knowledge and 
authorization, they may suffer harm in the sense of being deprived of 
their autonomous right to be let alone.33 Alternatively, when individu-
als are not adequately equipped with information pertinent to their 
decision about whether or not to participate in a course of action - be 
it medical treatment, direct participation in research, or the provision 
of tissue for research - they suffer a dignitary harm by being de-
prived of their autonomous right to choose.34 
An interest in controlling the use of one's DNA that is grounded 
on human dignity need not adopt reductionist views about personhood 
or the relationship between DNA and identity. Particular uses of one's 
DNA, in research or otherwise, may be viewed as thwarting the will 
of moral agents where such uses impede or undermine specific goals 
held by those agents. For instance, individuals may oppose research 
on the genetics of certain behavioral or other traits, like intelligence or 
30. Portions of Part II.A build on my prior work. See Ram, supra note 20, at 256-59. 
31. Robert M. Sade, Research on Stored Biological Samples Is Still Research, 162 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1439, 1440 (2002). 
32. IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDWORK OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 38 (Mary 
Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1997) (1785); see also Sade, supra note 31, at 1440 
(arguing that tissue providers should be referred to as "research subjects" rather than as 
"sources" because the latter term "suggest[s] that [tissue providers] are things rather than 
willing persons"). 
33. See Ballantyne, supra note 24, at 576. 
34. Id. 
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sexual orientation.35 Individuals might additionally believe that DNA, 
including or especially human DNA, should not be patented.36 In the 
absence of control over one's genetic material, however, researchers 
might well use an individual's DNA to conduct such experiments, or 
to isolate, copy, and patent an interesting gene.37 "Even if I do not 
hold extremely reductionist views of personhood, it might still be pos-
sible for me to conceive of the use of my bodily materials in these 
contexts as some way in which I was forced to contribute to a project 
that I opposed.,,38 This frustration of will, in tum, may be said to be an 
affront to the dignity of the individual. 
Concern for tissue providers' interest in control is not merely 
academic. Many people invest every use of their body, or pieces of it, 
with moral and ethical significance. Orthodox Jews, for example, of-
ten hold religious beliefs that the body must be buried whole; indeed, 
"[i]f a person's leg is amputated during his or her life, arrangements 
are made to store that body part for burial with the individual after 
death.,,39 More broadly, some leaders of the Jewish community have 
at times advised Jews to avoid participating in genetics research, fear-
ing discrimination against and stigmatization of the Jewish popula-
tion.4o Native Americans may also hold strong beliefs about the 
integrity of the body.41 Limitations short of absolute refusal to the 
research use of tissues may arise as well: 
35. See, e.g., DEAN HAMER & PETER COPELAND, THE SCIENCE OF DESIRE: THE SEARCH 
FOR THE GAY GENE AND THE BIOLOGY OF BEHAVIOR (1994) (research on the genetics of 
sexual orientation); Marc D. Schwartz et aI., Consent to the Use of Stored DNA for Genetics 
Research: A Survey of Attitudes in the Jewish Population, 98 AM. J. MED. GENETICS 336, 
341 (2001) (finding "a small, but statistically significant, reduction in willingness to partici-
pate in studies involving homosexuality or frugality ... both of which are potentially stig-
matizing"). 
36. See, e.g., Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Poli-
tics of Intellectual Property, 117 YALE L.J. 804, 806 (2008) (referring to advocates of a 
"free genome"); Madhavi Sunder, IP, 59 STAN. L. REv. 257, 275 (2006) (referring to theo-
rists who "worry especially about the commodification of that which is most personal to 
us - our very identity"). 
37. Ossorio, supra note 28, at 232. 
38.Id. 
39. Andrews, supra note 20, at 25. 
40. Karen H. Rothenberg & Amy B. Rutkin, Toward a Framework of Mutualism: The 
Jewish Community in Genetic Research, I COMMUNITY GENETICS 148, 149 (1999). On the 
whole, however, the Jewish community has embraced genetic research, including Tay-Sachs 
testing before marriage in the Orthodox community. See Gideon Bach et aI., Tay-Sachs 
Screening in the Jewish Ashkenazi Population: DNA Testing Is the Preferred Procedure, 99 
AM. J. MED. GENETICS 70,71 (2001). 
41. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 49; see also Larry Rohter, In 
the Amazon, Giving Blood but Getting Nothing, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2007, at AI ('''A soul 
can only be at rest after the entire body is cremated,' said Davi Yanomami, a leader of the 
[Yanomami tribe in the Amazon of Brazil]. 'To have the blood of a dead person preserved 
and separated from the remainder of the body is simply unacceptable to us. "'). 
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[S]ome people may wish to limit the use of their 
samples to noncommercial entities. Others may wish 
to forbid the use of their samples to investigate cer-
tain disorders, particularly if the disorders are stig-
matizing for a specific population group, as an 
alcoholism gene might be. In addition, retaining tis-
sue samples or immortalizing cell lines may violate 
cultural or religious beliefs.42 
127 
Thus, informed consent - really, informed choice - plays an 
essential role in protecting tissue providers' interests in control. Con-
sequently, informed consent is fundamentally an expression of respect 
for human dignity: "To say that one cannot be bound by a promise 
that one did not voluntarily and knowingly make is to say that the in-
dividual should be the author of her own undertakings, that a genuine 
respect for her dignity requires a broad deference to her choices.'.43 
Moreover, respect for the tissue provider's interest in control 
emerges not only from considerations of respect for human dignity, 
but also from more consequentialist considerations about maximizing 
the amount of tissue available for research. Research on public atti-
tudes regarding consent to the research use of tissue reveals that, 
while most potential tissue providers are happy to grant broad consent 
for future use of their tissues, a large majority also believe that their 
consent should be required before research commences where re-
search uses clinically-derived samples retaining personal identifiers.44 
Individuals may refuse to provide tissue for research if they fear 
that their interests in controlling the future uses of their cells and ge-
netic information will not be respected. Trust, in other words, is sig-
nificant. Studies on informed consent consistently show that African 
Americans consent to genetic research at rates that are statistically 
significantly lower than those of whites45 and that African Americans 
42. Clayton et aI., supra note 20, at 1788. 
43. Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed Consent, \03 YALE LJ. 899, 900 (1994); see 
also Allen Buchanan, An Ethical Frameworkfor Biological Samples Policy, in 2 RESEARCH 
INVOLVING HUMAN BIOLOGICAL MATERIALS: ETHICAL ISSUES AND POLICY GUIDANCE, B-
1,8-16 (2000). 
44. Dave Wendler & Ezekiel Emanuel, The Debate over Research on Stored Biological 
Samples, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 1457, 1459-60 (2002). More than ten percent of 
respondents also indicated that they believed consent should be required for additional re-
search using research-derived samples that have been stripped of personally identifying 
information. Id. at 1460. 
45. See, e.g., Donna T. Chen et aI., Research with Stored Biological Samples, 165 
ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 652, 654 (2005) (finding that 88.4% of whites authorized unlim-
ited future research using their tissues, while only 75% of African Americans did so 
(P<O.OOI)); Beth M. Ford et aI., Factors Associated with Enrollment in Cancer Genetics 
Research, 15 CANCER EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1355, 1357 (2006) 
(finding that 63.4% of white colorectal cancer patient-participants enrolled in cancer genet-
ics research, while only 45.7% of non-white colorectal cancer patient-participants enrolled 
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are less trusting of medical researchers than whites.46 Past abuses in 
medical interventions and research involving African Americans, such 
as "the infamous Tuskegee syphilis experiment and the chaotic condi-
tions attending early sickle-cell anemia carrier trait screening,'>'!7 sug-
gest that their distrust of the research establishment is not entirely 
without foundation. Women are also less likely than men to consent to 
the research use of their cells.48 
Broad research participation should not, however, be compelled 
by dispensing with consent altogether and generally conscripting tis-
sue left over from other interventions. Indeed, doing so might cause 
individuals concerned about the future use of their cells to forego rou-
tine medical care in order to prevent their cells from being so con-
scripted.49 This outcome was recently addressed in a lawsuit over the 
unauthorized use of tissue samples obtained from the Havasupai, a 
Native American tribe living in the Grand Canyon.50 Havasupai tribe 
members learned that tissue samples they had willingly provided for 
(P=0.019)); Geraldine M. McQuillan, Qiyuan Pan & Kathryn S. Porter, Consentfor Genetic 
Research in a General Population: An Update on the National Health and Nutrition Exami-
nation Survey Experience, 8 GENETICS MED. 354, 357-58 (2006); Patricia G. Moonnan et 
aI., Racial Differences in Enrollment in a Cancer Genetics Registry, 13 CANCER 
EPIDEMIOLOGY BIOMARKERS & PREVENTION 1349, 1350 (2004) (finding that enrollment of 
African American women in a cancer genetics registry was lower, by a statistically signifi-
cant degree, than enrollment of white women (15% and 36%, respectively (P<O.OOOI)), and 
that this difference was not due to socio-economic characteristics or other cancer risk fac-
tors). 
46. See, e.g., Giselle Corbie-Smith, Stephen B. Thomas & Diane Marie M. St. George, 
Distrust, Race, and Research, 162 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2458,2460 (2002) [hereinaf-
ter Corbie-Smith et aI., Distrust, Race, and Research] (finding that, even after controlling 
for certain socio-economic variables, African American participants remained nearly five 
times more likely than white participants to give distrustful responses); see also id. at 2458 
(collecting sources of other studies documenting that distrust may play an important role in 
refusal to participate in research, and identifying some limitations of these studies). See 
generally Giselle Corbie-Smith et aI., Attitudes and Belieft of African Americans Toward 
Participation in Medical Research, 141. GEN. INTERNAL MED. 537, 537 (1999) [hereinafter 
Corbie-Smith et aI., Attitudes and Belieft] (finding that distrust of the medical community is 
a prominent barrier to African American participation in research). 
47. Rayna Rapp, Refusing Prenatal Diagnosis: The Meanings of Bioscience in a Multi-
cultural World, 23 SCI. TECH. & HUM. V ALOES 45, 49 (1998). 
48. See Ford et aI., supra note 45 (finding that 66.8% of male colorectal cancer patient-
participants enrolled in cancer genetics research, while only 58.2% of female colorectal 
cancer patient-participants enrolled (P=0.004)); McQuillan et aI., supra note 45, at 357. This 
pattern of lower rates of consent by women, and by African Americans, is distinct and sepa-
rate from broader patterns of under-enrollment of women and minority individuals in medi-
cal research. See Rebecca Dresser, Wanted: Single, White Male for Medical Research, 22 
HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24, 24 (1992) (discussing the underrepresentation of women in 
medical research generally, and noting as "[m]ost amazing" a research project on "the im-
pact of obesity on breast and uterine cancer conducted - you guessed it - solely on men"). 
49. Cf I. Glenn Cohen, The Right Not To Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 1115, 
1157 (2008) ("The argument for [a right to consent] becomes stronger when one factors in 
the cost of self-protective measures an individual might take if the law did not protect that 
person's interest in unwanted genetic parenthood without any prior consent."). 
50. See Havasupai Tribe v. Ariz. Bd. of Regents, 204 P.3d 1063 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008), 
review denied, No. CV-09-0007-PR (Apr. 20, 2009). 
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genetic research related to diabetes had also been used for a range of 
unauthorized studies, including some that directly undermined the 
tribe's core religious beliefs about their origins. In initiating litigation 
against the university controlling and dispensing the tissue samples, 
the Havasupai asserted, "Many of our [members] now fear going to 
the health clinic, seeking medical attention, or providing blood sam-
ples for medical diagnosis or treatment.,,51 Some African American 
women have also, on occasion, refused prenatal diagnosis out of fear 
that their amniotic tissue may be used for unconsented-to research. 52 
Respect for provider control therefore has both a deontological and a 
utilitarian basis. 
In addition to a requirement of informed consent, taking the tissue 
provider's interest in control seriously also generally requires some 
kind of right to withdraw - especially where a tissue provider dis-
covers that her cells are being used for purposes beyond the terms of 
her consent. This right ensures that tissue providers have "exit" in 
addition to voice as a means for enforcing their choices after tissue 
has been removed. 53 Current federal guidelines governing federally-
funded human subjects research recognize the right to withdraw as 
integral to protecting subjects' autonomy in research participation. 54 
Indeed, the Eighth Circuit's decision in Catalona acknowledged a 
limited right to withdraw from research participation via tissue sample 
destruction, despite the court's recognition of Washington University 
as the sole owner of the tissue contained in its bio-repository.55 
2. Confidentiality 
A tissue provider's interest in confidentiality is a privacy interest 
in protecting the provider from the negative impact of unwanted dis-
51. Id. at 1069. 
52. Dorothy Nelkin & Lori B. Andrews, Introduction: The Body, Economic Power and 
Social Control, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 3,7 (1999); see also Chen et aI., supra note 45, at 
654 (reporting an empirical study showing that, given the option to permit all future re-
search use of their tissues, African Americans were less likely than whites to provide this 
unlimited authorization); Corbie-Smith et aI., Distrust, Race, and Research, supra note 46, 
at 2459 ("African Americans were more likely [than whites] to believe that someone like 
them would be used as a guinea pig without his or her consent (79.2% vs 51.9%, P<O.OI)."). 
53. On the importance of both voice and exit in mediating relationships between parties, 
see ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). 
54. The Code of Federal Regulations describes the right as follows: 
[I]n seeking informed consent the following information shall be pro-
vided to each subject: ... A statement that participation is voluntary, 
refusal to participate will involve no penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the subject is otherwise entitled, and the subject may discon-
tinue participation at any time without penalty or loss of benefits to 
which the subject is otherwise entitled. 
45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2005) (emphasis added). 
55. Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 
1122 (2008). 
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closure of information about the provider that is discovered through 
research. This interest is of increasing salience as researchers under-
take more work involving genetic analysis. This is so because genetic 
analysis can yield information about the presence or absence of dis-
ease-related genes in a specific individual and, in some instances, in 
her close blood relatives.56 
There are at least two distinct senses in which breaches of confi-
dentiality may be detrimental to the interests of a tissue provider. 
First, if third parties such as insurance providers or employers gain 
access to this information, they may find ways to refuse, limit, or ter-
minate individuals' insurance, employment, or other opportunities.57 
The Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act ("GINA") promises 
to protect individuals from discrimination on the basis of genetic in-
formation in employment and health insurance.58 This is an encourag-
ing sign, although it is unclear how the Act will operate in practice. 
Second, unrequested disclosure of information to the tissue pro-
vider or her family may cause distress or embarrassment.59 If a tissue 
provider learns through genetic research that she carries the gene for 
Huntington's disease, for example, this knowledge is likely to have a 
profound impact on her and her family,60 particularly her children, 
who have a fifty percent chance of also carrying the detrimental 
gene.61 In addition to making it more difficult for the tissue provider 
56. See, e.g., Wylie Burke, Genetic Testing, 347 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1867, 1867--68 
(2002) (identifying a range of medical conditions (primarily ones that result from single 
nucleotide polymorphisms) for which genetic tests are currently available and observing that 
"[aj genetic diagnosis often indicates that other family members are at risk for the same 
condition"). 
57. See DOROTHY NELKIN & LAURENCE TANCREDI, DANGEROUS DIAGNOSTICS: THE 
SOCIAL POWER OF BIOLOGICAL INFORMATION 3, 6-7 (1989); Ashburn et aI., supra note 19, 
at 3378 (2000). 
58. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881. 
59. See Stewart A. Laidlaw, Leslie J. Raffel & Judith F. Daar, Genetic Testing and Hu-
man Subjects in Research, 24 WHITTIER L. REv. 429, 460 (2002) ("Emotional or psycho-
logical harms from learning one is a carrier of a genetic disease can be devastating. This is 
particularly true when the onset of the disease is a virtual certainty, such as in the case of 
Huntington's disease."); see also Angela Liang, Note, The Argument Against a Physician's 
Duty to Warn for Genetic Diseases: The Conflicts Created by Safer v. Estate of Pack, 1 J. 
HEALTH CARE L. & POL'y 437, 444-45 (1998) (characterizing the chronic stress created by 
the diagnosis of a genetic disorder as the "shattered self-adequacy syndrome"); Sonia M. 
Suter, Note, Whose Genes Are These Anyway?: Familial Conflicts over Access to Genetic 
Information, 91 MICH. L. REv. 1854, 1860 (1993) ("Genetic data are also unique in how 
they may affect self-identity. Empirical evidence shows that the knowledge or assumption 
that one carries certain disease genes can affect self-perception." (citation omitted)). 
60. See Laidlaw et aI., supra note 59, at 460 (describing the problem of "family strife," in 
which some family members "protest[] the test itself so as not to open an investigation into 
the family's genetic reality"). 
61. Huntington's disease ("HD") is a neurodegenerative disorder that is caused by a mu-
tation in a single gene: "an expanded trinucleotide repeat in the gene encoding hunting-
tin ... located on chromosome 4pI6.3." Nat'! Ctr. for Biotech. Info., OMIM - Huntington 
Disease; HD, http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/entrezldispomim.cgi?id=1431 00 (last visited 
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to obtain necessary insurance, disclosure of this information is often 
emotionally devastating. Alternatively, if genetic analysis in research 
exposes mismatched paternity, disclosure is likely to be stressful to 
existing family relationships and potentially embarrassing to all par-
ties involved.62 
Traditionally, researchers have taken a number of steps to protect 
the confidentiality of tissue providers. Tissue samples may be coded, 
meaning that they are assigned a number that corresponds to a secret 
file containing identifying information.63 Identifying information for a 
particular tissue sample can only be obtained with access to a decod-
ing program or database. Alternatively, researchers and institutions 
may "anonymize" or "de-identify" tissue samples, a process designed 
to completely and permanently separate the sample from identifying 
information.64 
In an age of genetic analysis, however, it is unclear whether true 
anonymization can ever be achieved.65 DNA is as individually identi-
Dec. 20, 2009). The disease is a dominant, autosomal disorder, which means that a single 
copy of the mutated gene will give rise to the disease. As a result, an individual for whom 
genetic analysis reveals the presence of the HD mutation is nearly certain to develop Hunt-
ington's disease. Moreover, because one copy of an individual's HD gene will have been 
inherited from each genetic parent and passed on to each genetic child, the presence of an 
HD mutation in one individual indicates that one of that individual's genetic parents also 
has the HD mutation and that each of that individual's genetic children has a 50% chance of 
having inherited the gene as well. See HARVEY F. LODISH ET AL., MOLECULAR CELL 
BIOLOGY 395 (5th ed. 2004) (identifYing three common inheritance patterns for human 
genetic diseases). 
62. Susan M. Denbo, What Your Genes Know Affects Them: Should Patient Confidential-
ity Prevent Disclosure o/Genetic Test Results to a Patient's Biological Relatives?, 43 AM. 
Bus. L.J. 561, 598 (2006) ("[T]he revelation of genetic test results to family members may 
cause a special type of harm, one that some commentators have labeled the 'family secrets' 
problem."). 
63. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 58 (defining "[c]oded 
samples" as samples "supplied from identified specimens by repositories to investigators," 
which "do not include identifYing information" but instead "are accompanied by codes" so 
that the repository- but not a later investigator- may still "link the research findings 
derived from a sample with the individual source using the code"). 
64. See Ashburn et aI., supra note 19, at 3378 (describing an anonymization process 
adopted by Pfizer that irrevocably breaks links between samples and patient-identifYing 
information while retaining links to information gathered from samples obtained during 
clinical trials); see also 45 C.F.R. § 164.514(b)(2)(i) (2002) (setting forth eighteen identifi-
ers, the removal of which renders what would otherwise be personal health information "de-
identifi[ ed]" and outside the scope of the Privacy Rule of the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act (HIPAA». Under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009, the Secretary for Health and Human Services must issue guidance within twelve 
months of the Act's enactment regarding "how best to implement the requirements for the 
de-identification of protected health information." 42 U.S.C.S. § 17953 (Lexis 2009). 
65. See Amy L. McGuire & Richard A. Gibbs, Genetics: No Longer De-Identified, 312 
SCIENCE 370, 370 (2006) (identifYing research showing that "an individual can be uniquely 
identified with access to just 75 single-nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) from that person," 
while "[g]enomewide association studies routinely use more than 100,000 SNPs to genotype 
individuals"); see also M.B. Kapp, Ethical and Legal Issues in Research Involving Human 
Subjects: Do You Want a Piece 0/ Me?, 59 J. CLINICAL PATHOLOGY 335, 338 (2006) (de-
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fying as a fingerprint, and so nearly any individual cell could theoreti-
cally be traced back to its source.66 Moreover, protecting confidential-
ity through anonymization of tissue, particularly when undertaken 
without the consent of the tissue provider, may be at odds with the 
provider's ongoing interest in control of the uses of her tissues. If tis-
sue is truly anonymized, the tissue provider will have no way of 
knowing what research projects are using her tissue, nor will she be 
able to exercise her right to withdraw, as identifying her sample for 
destruction would no longer be possible. Nevertheless, tissue provid-
ers have a significant ongoing interest in preserving the confidentiality 
of information revealed about them through genetic and other re-
search. 
More problematic still for current approaches to protecting rele-
vant interests is the fact that genetic material is identifying not only to 
the person who provides it, but also to her close family members. An 
individual inherits fifty percent of her genetic material from each ge-
netic parent and is expected to have roughly twenty-five percent of 
her genes in common with any full sibling.67 Identical twins, of 
course, are expected to have identical or nearly identical genetic se-
quences.68 These inheritance patterns suggest that not only do con-
senting tissue providers have a stake in the confidentiality of their 
genetic information, but so also do their close genetic relatives. In this 
way, genetic information differs significantly from mere fingerr,rints, 
which are identifying only to the person from whom they come. 9 The 
shared nature of genetic information may necessitate new procedures 
for obtaining familial consent for the public disclosure of genetic in-
formation and techniques for coding and storing tissue samples that 
better respect both the confidentiality interests of tissue providers and 
the privacy interests of their family members. 70 
3. Commercialization 
Control over the use of one's tissues in research also embraces a 
range of interests in whether and how those tissues, and products de-
rived from them, are commercialized. The interests that tissue provid-
scribing current requirements under the HIP AA Privacy Rule for de-identifying tissues-
requirements that in fact lead to coded, but not truly de-identified, samples). 
66. See Andrews, supra note 20, at 24. 
67. BRUCE R. KORF, HUMAN GENETICS AND GENOMICS 36 (3d ed. 2007) (defining Men-
delian patterns of genetic inheritance). 
68. See DANIEL L. HARTL & ELIZABETH W. JONES, ESSENTIAL GENETICS: A GENOMICS 
PERSPECTIVE 544 (4th ed. 2006) (noting that identical twins are genetically identical be-
cause they arise from the splitting of a single fertilized egg). 
69. See Natalie Ram, The Mismatch Between Probable Cause and Partial Matching, 118 
YALE LJ. POCKET PART 182, 183-84 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/2009/041I3/ram.html. 
70. I have discussed one aspect of the familial nature of genetic information in other 
work. See id 
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ers advance concerning commercialization tend to follow one of two 
lines. The first approach contends that the commercialization of body 
products should be wholly proscribed, focusing on moral, ethical, or 
religious objections to the commercialization of pieces of the human 
body.7! American policy writ large reflects this non-commodification 
sensibility in significant ways. The sale and importation of human 
organs is forbidden by law,n and the sale of born persons is flatly 
unconstitutional. 73 
Many individuals have also questioned the ethical consequences 
of permitting commodification and sale of body parts. For some, the 
language and values of the market - commensurability, fungibility, 
and the like - threaten to undermine human dignity and human rela-
tionships when applied to human bodies or their parts.74 Separately, 
concerns about coercion and exploitation of those with little informa-
tion, education, or other options for obtaining income must also be 
seriousll considered before embracing remuneration for tissue pro-
viders.7 This concern is particularly salient given the global nature of 
scientific research and data, as those who bear the burden of produc-
ing tissue for research may not be the ones who enjoy the benefits 
flowing from research.76 
The second approach to interests in commercialization argues for 
providing compensation to those who provide tissue for research.77 
71. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 49 ("Some individuals 
may object to the possibility that researchers could sell their samples to companies for prof-
it."); Radin, supra note 27, at 1877-87. 
72.42 U.S.c. § 274e (2006). 
73. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII § I. 
74. See. e.g., Ossorio, supra note 28, at 238-39; Radin, supra note 27, at 1877-87; Sonia 
M. Suter, Disentangling Privacy from Property: Toward a Deeper Understanding of Ge-
netic Privacy, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 737, 746-47 (2004) (arguing that the connection 
between property and markets "undermines the relationships in which we share [genetic 
information], pushing them toward arms-length transactions as opposed to relationships of 
trust"). 
75. See. e.g., Donna Dickenson, Commentary, Commodification of Human Tissue: Impli-
cations for Feminist and Development EthiCS, 2 DEVELOPING WORLD BIOETHICS 55 (2002); 
Rob Stein, NY. To Pay for Eggs for Stem Cell Research, WASH. POST, June 26, 2009, at A4 
(reporting that critics of New York's policy to pay women to provide eggs for stem cell 
research "worry that the move could lead to the exploitation of women, especially poor 
women, who tend not to be in demand for infertility donation"). 
76. See Dickenson, supra note 75 (arguing that human eggs required for cloning for bio-
medical research are likely to come from women in the southern hemisphere and support 
research in the northern hemisphere and be available only to those in the North); see also 
Joint Oversight Hearing on the Implementation of Proposition 71. the Stem Cell Research 
and Cures Act, 2005 Leg. (Cal. 2005) (statement of Francine Coeytaux, Pro-Choice Alli-
ance for Responsible Research), available at http://www.geneticsandsociety.orglresources/ 
items/20050309 _senate_coeytaux.html (noting that so long as financial inducement is avail-
able, most human eggs obtained for cloning for biomedical research will come from poor 
women). 
77. See. e.g., Korobkin, supra note 17, at 47; William Boulier, Note, Sperm. Spleens. and 
Other Valuables: The Need to Recognize Property Rights in Human Body Parts, 23 
HOFSTRA L. REv. 693, 715-31 (1995) (arguing that recognizing a property right in the body 
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The status quo results in a system in which researchers and their insti-
tutions may profit from the products of research, but those who pro-
vide the raw materials of research do not share in the economic 
benefits of the fruits of that provision.78 This "double standard" arises 
because the default rule provides tissue providers with no compensa-
tion,79 while simultaneously permitting researchers, biotechnology 
companies, and pharmaceutical or medical device makers to reap the 
commercial rewards of the results of research using human tissue.8o 
For individuals whose tissue is uniquely useful, this double standard 
may appear especially exploitative. 
Courts have traditionally been very reluctant to permit individuals 
to profit from tissue provision. As Bartha Knoppers and Claude La-
berge note, "individual agreements to share in profits with the [tissue 
providers] are often considered morally repugnant.,,81 In one recent 
case, however, a judge permitted plaintiffs to proceed with a claim of 
unjust enrichment against an appropriating researcher.82 This suggests 
that, at least when providers' tissues are unique or uniquely valuable, 
some right to remuneration may be appropriate. Some scholars have 
suggested benefit-sharing models that seek to compensate tissue pro-
will allow the legal system to handle demand for body parts and allow individuals to gain 
better control over their bodies); Roy Hardiman, Comment, Toward the Right ofCommerci-
ality: Recognizing Property Rights in the Commercial Value of Human Tissue, 34 UCLA L. 
REv. 207, 213 (1986) (arguing for a limited "commerciality" right in the body). 
78. See, e.g., Jasper Bovenberg, Commentary, Whose Tissue Is It Anyway?, 23 NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 929, 929 (2005); Charlotte H. Harrison, Neither Moore nor the Market: 
Alternative Models for Compensating Contributors of Human Tissue, 28 AM. J.L. & MED. 
77,77(2002). 
79. See Mopre v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 489 (Cal. 1990) (precluding 
Moore from asserting any property right to his cells once removed from his body, while 
recognizing the propriety of the researchers using his cells to patent and profit from their 
research results); Harrison, supra note 78, at 77 (describing the no-compensation default 
and noting that the status quo is often criticized as a "double standard"); Korobkin, supra 
note 17, at 45--46 (identifYing the no-compensation default for tissue providers). 
80. Harrison, supra note 78, at 77. As one example, despite cases like Moore and Green-
berg v. Miami Children's Hospital Research Institution, Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064 (S.D. 
Fla. 2003), which deny tissue providers any property interest in their excised cells, the 
USPTD and the Federal Circuit have made the issuance of patents pertaining to genetic 
sequences from human sources a fairly routine matter. According to one study, nearly 
twenty percent of human gene sequences are "explicitly claimed" as intellectual property. 
Kyle Jensen & Fiona Murray, Intellectual Property Landscape of the Human Genome, 310 
SCIENCE 239,239 (2005). 
81. Bartha Maria Knoppers & Claude M. Laberge, Research and Stored Tissues: Persons 
as Sources, Samples as Persons?, 274 JAMA 1806, 1806 (1995); see also ROBERT F. WEIR 
& ROBERT S. DUCK, THE STORED TiSSUE ISSUE: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH, ETHICS, AND 
LAW IN THE ERA OF GENOMIC MEDICINE 123 (2004) (noting that nearly all ethics and re-
search organizations have adopted some version of a noncommercialization position, with 
some identifYing the removal of human tissue specifically for commercial profit as im-
moral). 
82. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1072-73. 
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viders for their contributions while minimizing the economic, and 
potentially exploitative, incentive to provide tissue.83 
None of the legal systems considered in this Article provide firm 
guidance on the precise shape that rules governing tissue commer-
cialization should take. As discussed in Part IILB.3, this holds true 
even for a private property regime.84 Private property regimes are, of 
course, often associated with commodification and commercial mar-
kets,85 but not all property is necessarily market-alienable.86 This Ar-
ticle does not advocate for a specific solution to the 
commercialization quandary. Instead, it reserves this issue and simply 
notes where issues of commercialization might enter our analysis of 
the various frameworks discussed below. 
4. Cure 
Tissue providers often have a substantial interest in the outcome 
of research that is distinct from society's general interest in the pro-
gress of science. Studies on informed consent show that individuals 
often want access to health information learned through the research 
use of their tissues. 87 In the vast majority of cases, tissues stored in 
American bio-repositories were originally collected in the course of 
diagnostic or therapeutic interventions.88 Patients who provide dis-
ease-related tissue for research often hope to benefit directly. Informa-
tion learned about how a particular tumor responds in the lab, for 
83. See Jon F. Merz et aI., Protecting Subjects' Interests in Genetics Research, 70 AM. J. 
HUM. GENETICS 965 (2002); HUMAN GENOME ORG. ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND SOC. ISSUES 
COMM., STATEMENT ON THE PRINCIPLED CONDUCT OF GENETIC RESEARCH (1996), avail-
able at http://www.eubios.infoIHUGO.htm (prohibiting "undue inducement" to participate 
in research, but permitting benefit-sharing through "the possible use of a percentage of any 
royalties for humanitarian purposes"). But see Clayton et aI., supra note 20, at 1789 (noting 
that some commentators "have expressed concern that offering [tissue providers] a share of 
profits would be manipulative because the possibility that a profitable product will be de-
veloped from any particular research project is so low"). 
84. See infra notes 243-45 and accompanying text. 
85. See, e.g., Ossorio, supra note 28, at 237 ("[T]he buying and selling in the market is a 
defming conceptual feature of property. "); Suter, supra note 74, at 746 ("At heart, the term 
'property' connotes control within the marketplace."). 
86. See, e.g., Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 510 (Cal. 1990) 
(Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[S]ome types of personal property may be sold but not given away, 
while others may be given away but not sold, and still others may neither be given away nor 
sold." (citations omitted)}; see also Radin, supra note 27, at 1903-36 (advocating that cer-
tain interests should be market-inalienable: capable of being given away, but not sold). 
87. Wendler & Emanuel, supra note 44, at 1459 (reporting that "88.8% of all respondents 
want to be informed and 82.1 % want their physicians informed of research results of uncer-
tain clinical significance"); see also Robert F. Weir & Jay R. Horton, DNA Banking and 
Informed Consent - Part 2, IRB, Sept.-Dec. 1995, at 1,4 (suggesting that many "reasona-
bly prudent persons" would expect to be given information regarding the "future access ... 
to the personally relevant information gained through [a genetic] study"). 
88. NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 14. 
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example, can inform an individual's cancer treatment.89 Return of 
research results is only possible, however, if knowledge gleaned about 
a particular tissue sample can be traced to an identifiable tissue pro-
vider. Thus, like the tissue provider's interest in control, a tissue pro-
vider's interest in improved treatment may be in tension with her 
interest in confidentiality, especially if confidentiality is protected 
through anonymization oftissues.9o 
Patients as tissue providers may also benefit indirectly as more is 
learned about the disease from which they suffer. Eventually, research 
may result in more effective treatments or a cure for their disease. 
Tissue providers not suffering from a particular disease at the time 
they provide tissue may also benefit in this way if they or their loved 
ones develop that disease in the future. 
Finally, tissue providers generally have an interest in the progress 
of science through research.91 This is a benefit accruing to all know-
ing tissue providers, independent of their current or future health con-
dition. Healthy individuals providing tissue in the course of routine 
medical interactions or in specific research collections may advance 
their interests in promoting research by providing tissue that makes 
such research possible. Similar to the patient-specific benefits gleaned 
from research, in many instances the progress of medical research is 
89. See Brief of Appellant-Defendants Richard Ward et al. at 40, Wash. Univ. v. Cata-
lona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2286 & 06-2301) ("[T]issue samples provide a 
record of the state of patients' cancer at the time of their surgery. Comparison of such sam-
ples to later tissue biopsies can provide important information about the progress of the 
disease and response to treatment." (citations omitted». As this example suggests, the hope 
for personal benefit from research is not necessarily imagined. Without appropriate informa-
tion, however, research participants may fall subject to therapeutic misconception - the 
misunderstanding that the intervention in which they are taking part is therapy, not research. 
Where potential research participants labor under a therapeutic misconception, they may 
consent to bear burdens they might not otherwise accept, wrongly believing that researchers 
have only the participant's health and best interests at heart. See David Wendler & Christine 
Grady, What Should Research Participants Understand to Understand They Are Partici-
pants in Research?, 22 BIOETHICS 203, 204-07 (2008) (describing therapeutic misconcep-
tion and identifYing three facts that research participants should understand in order to 
ensure that they properly understand that they are participating in research, not a therapeutic 
intervention). 
90. See Philip R. Reilly, Mark F. Boshar & Steven H. Holtzman, Commentary, Ethical 
Issues in Genetic Research: Disclosure and Informed Consent, 15 NATURE GENETICS 16, 
17 (1997) (noting that anonyrnizing tissue samples "largely eliminates the possibility that a 
participant in research might gain directly from that activity"). 
91. See, e.g., Christine Grady, Payment of Clinical Research Subjects, 115 J. CLINICAL 
INVESTIGATION 1681, 1682 (2005) (observing that research participants generally "appear 
to have a variety of other motives besides those of a financial nature for participation in 
research, including curiosity, altruism, sensation seeking, and desire for attention provided 
by physicians"); Margaret L. Russell, Donna G. Moralejo & Ellen D. Burgess, Paying Re-
search Subjects: Participants' Perspectives, 26 J. MED. ETHICS 126, 127 (2000) (reporting 
that research participants identified "benefits to society (for example, 'participate in ad-
vancement of knowledge,' 'benefit others'); [and] psychological benefits to the participant 
(for example, 'contribute ... to the success of the research')" among their motivations for 
participation). 
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best served by maintaining identifiable tissues.92 Thus, here again, the 
tissue provider's interest in promoting research crosscuts her interest 
in protecting the confidentiality of her genetic information. 
B. Some Interests of Researchers and Society 
Like tissue providers, other constituents in the research enterprise 
have strong interests in promoting good research using human tissue. 
Society at large has a profound interest in the progress of science, 
which manifests itself in several important ways. Chief among these 
are facilitating researcher access to research materials, incentivizing 
investment in high quality research, and ensuring that research is con-
ducted in a responsible and ethical fashion. The last of these corre-
sponds most closely with protection of the interests of tissue providers 
set forth above. The remaining two are reflected in interests asserted 
by researchers and already recognized by courts: access to research 
materials and ability to commercialize and profit from gains made 
through research.93 Accordingly, these interests require less explica-
tion at the outset. 
Research involving human tissue is often concerned with tissue as 
a source of information. While human tissue has always provided in-
formation about an individual's health status, today this tissue can 
provide health and other information with startling specificity. In ad-
dition to uncovering the individual and population-wide presence of 
genes contributing to disease, research may also reveal genetic bases 
for traits with social, rather than medical, significance.94 Human tissue 
is also a valuable source of raw materials for diagnostic tests and cell 
lines.95 As Dorothy Nelkin and Lori Andrews note, "[t]he market for 
skin, blood, placenta, gametes, biopsied tissue and genetic material is 
expanding, driven in part by commercial incentives fostered by legal 
developments in the 1980s. ,,96 
For both researchers and society at large, simple and inexpensive 
access to the raw materials of research is critical to promoting invest-
92. Ashburn et aI., supra note 19, at 3378 ("[M]aintaining a link to the donor's clinical 
information allows researchers to obtain follow-up information from the donor's clinical 
records to test, for instance, a putative genetic marker's value as a predictor of disease or to 
allow follow-up studies."). 
93. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1070, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (dismissing both a claim of failure to obtain informed 
consent and a claim of conversion due in part to concerns about "chill[ing]" or "crippl[ing]" 
medical research); Moore v. Regents of the University of California, 793 P.2d 479, 493 
(Cal. 1990) (emphasizing the need not to threaten "innocent parties who are engaged in 
socially useful activities" with "disabling civil liability"). 
94. See, e.g., HAMER & COPELAND, supra note 35 (sexual orientation); Katrina Kelner & 
John Benditt, Genes and Behavior, 264 SCIENCE 1685 (1994) (behavioral traits); Gail Vines, 
Genes in Black and White, NEW SCIENTIST, July 8, 1995, at 34 (race). 
95. Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 52, at 5. 
96. [d. 
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ment in science and medicine. Researchers and those who fund re-
search have a strong interest in minimizing roadblocks to research. 
Where there are fewer permissions to obtain, research can proceed 
more quickly and with less cost. Where property experts once warned 
about the problems of the commons,97 modem researchers and schol-
ars are concerned about an anticommons in biomedical research.98 
Some scientists fear that "too many patents related to a single gene 
may actually impede useful research since it will be difficult (and 
costly) for a researcher to gain licenses from each patent holder.,,99 
The addition and protection of more rigorous consent or other re-
quirements designed to facilitate provider control over the use, disclo-
sure, and commercialization of tissue may exacerbate these problems. 
As such, any policy recommendation must temper protection of tissue 
providers' interests with an understanding of the interplay of such 
interests with the overall practice of science. 
Researchers - and the institutions in which they work - also 
have a strong interest in the financial rewards of commercial science 
and medicine. In the United States, patents are awarded in order to 
"promote the Progress of Science and the useful ArtS."IOO In other 
words, we award patents in large part to encourage investment in sci-
ence. Where profits are diluted by burdensome transaction and other 
costs associated with obtaining access to tissue, investment in re-
search may decrease. 101 
III. A NEW APPROACH 
Armed with an understanding of the interests at stake in the rela-
tionships between tissue providers, researchers, and broader society, 
97. See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy a/the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244 (1968). 
98. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17, at 698. 
99. Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 52, at 5 (citing John Murray, Note, Owning Genes: 
Disputes Involving DNA Sequence Patents, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 231, 233-35 (1999)); see 
also Complaint at 2, Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 
09CV4515 (S.D.N.Y. May 12, 2009) ("Ease of access to genomic discoveries is crucial if 
basic research is to be expeditiously translated in clinical laboratory tests that benefit pa-
tients in the emerging era of personalized and predictive medicine. The [BRCA I & 
BRCA2] patents make ease of access more restricted."). 
100. U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8. 
10 I. This profit motive did not always figure so prominently in the practice of science. 
Before 1980, most inventions made with government funding went unpatented. See Joshua 
A. Newberg & Richard L. Dunn, Keeping Secrets in the Campus Lab: Law, Values and 
Rules a/Engagement/or Industry-University R&D Partnerships, 39 AM. Bus. L.J. 187, 193 
(2002). However, the Bayh-Dole Act, enacted in 1980, permits and encourages government-
funded researchers to patent and commercially develop their inventions. 18 U.S.C. §§ 200-
212. In the years since Bayh-Dole was enacted, universities, often the recipients offederal 
research funding, have become avid patentees and may even have come to depend on pat-
ents and "tech transfer" as a source of revenue. See Rochelle Dreyfuss, Protecting the Pub-
lic Domain a/Science: Has the Time/or an Experimental Use De/ense Arrived?, 46 ARIZ. 
L. REV. 457,463--64 (2004). 
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this Part offers a new way forward for approaching these relationships 
and explores how the informational property model works alongside 
and improves traditional models in tort, contract, and property. Dif-
ferent approaches yield different strengths and weaknesses, of course. 
Conceptualizing the relationship as one governed by the rules of tort, 
for instance, may entail significantly different outcomes than a con-
ceptual framework of private property.102 Nevertheless, the informa-
tional property model, if properly formulated, offers significant 
advantages as a starting point for designing appropriate research gov-
ernance. 
Before introducing potential governance models, it is worth not-
ing the system of public rules and regulations already potentially ap-
plicable to such research. At the federal level, research involving 
human subjects conducted using federal monies must comply with the 
Common Rule.103 The Common Rule requires researchers to provide 
potential research participants with extensive information in the 
course of obtaining informed consent, including information about the 
expected risks and benefits of the research and confidentiality proce-
dures to be followed. 104 As noted previously, these regulations also 
stipulate that human subjects be informed that research tarticipation is 
optional and consent may be withdrawn at any time. 10 The Common 
Rule does not specify any rules regarding payment, except to say that 
participants must be informed about possible compensation to which 
they may be entitled if research results in injury to them.106 The Rule 
also contains a provision relating to the communication of research 
findings to participants, although such disclosure appears to be condi-
tioned on whether the information "relate[s] to the subject's willing-
ness to continue participation."lo7 The FDA imposes similar 
requirements for all studies submitted for its review.108 Together, 
these two federal standards govern the vast majority of human sub-
jects research conducted in the United States. Finally, the Privacy 
Rule promulgated under the Health Insurance Portability and Ac-
countability Act ("HIPAA") generally requires that a covered entity 
obtain authorization from an individual for the research use or disclo-
102. See Ossorio, supra note 2S, at 237 (offering two possible reasons why conceptual 
framework matters: first, because the framework attached "would likely change the legal 
landscape with respect to how one's rights were respected and exercised," and second, 
because "the words we use structure our thinking and our behavior"); cf id. at 241 (conclud-
ing that "legal rules governing possession, use, and sale of human bodily materials can and 
should be promulgated, regardless of whether we affix the label 'property' to these materi-
als"). 
103. See 45 C.F.R. §§ 46.101-.124 (2009). 
104.Id. § 46.116(a)(2)-(3), (5). 
105.Id. § 46.116(a)(S). 
106.Id. § 46.116(a)(6). 
107.Id. § 46.116(b)(5). 
lOS. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 50, 56, 812 (2009). 
140 Harvard Journal of Law & Technology [Vol. 23 
sure of her protected health information (including individually identi-
fiable genetic information), unless a regulatory permission applies. lo9 
To date, however, agencies and courts have been hesitant to im-
pose similar requirements on researchers using human tissue in re-
search, especially where tissue has been "de-identified.,,11O In 2004, 
the federal Office of Human Research Protections issued a guidance 
document stating that "tissue collection for present or future research 
purposes is not subject to [Institutional Review Board ("IRB")] re-
view and informed consent provisions of the Common Rule, as long 
as there is no personally identifiable information attached to the tissue 
specimens.,,111 In 2006, the FDA followed suit. 112 HIPAA's disclosure 
restrictions are generally inapplicable to health information that has 
been de-identified, as such information is not included in the Privacy 
Rule's definition of "protected health information.,,113 
Moreover, even if these federal statutes and regulations were ap-
plied to human tissue research or genetic information across the 
board, they would provide relatively little protection for individual 
tissue providers. Where a violation of the Common Rule is discov-
ered, the funding agency may withdraw federal funds from a re-
searcher or institution. 114 No civil or criminal enforcement action of 
these rules is mandated. Under HIPAA, the federal government may 
impose penalties on covered entities and their business associates for 
violations of the Privacy Rule. lls Penalties, however, have generally 
109.45 C.F.R. § 164.512(i) (setting forth regulatory exceptions to the rule of required au-
thorization). GINA clarifies that genetic information is "health information," 42 U .S.C.S. § 
1320d-9(a)(I) (Lex is 2009), but HIPAA's disclosure restrictions apply only to health infor-
mation that is "individually identifiable." See 45 C.F.R. § I 64.502(d)(2). 
110. Again, it is questionable whether DNA can ever be truly de-identified. See McGuire 
& Gibbs, supra note 65. 
III. Kapp, supra note 65, at 336. 
112. Guidance on Informed Consent for In Vitro Diagnostic Device Studies Using Left-
over Human Specimens That Are Not Individually Identifiable, 71 Fed. Reg. 1429, 1430 
(Jan. 9, 2006) (providing notice that the FDA "intends to exercise enforcement discretion 
when," inter alia, "[t]he study uses leftover specimens"; "[t]he specimens are not individu-
ally identifiable"; "[t]he specimens are provided to the investigator(s) without identifiers"; 
"[t]he individuals caring for the patients are different from, and do not share information 
with, those conducting the investigation"; and "[t]he study has been reviewed by an IRB."). 
113. See 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(d)(2); § 164.514(a) (2009) ("Health information that does 
not identify an individual and with respect to which there is no reasonable basis to believe 
that the information can be used to identify an individual is not individually identifiable 
health information."). The Privacy Rule also permits protected health information to be 
disclosed without authorization in some instances, including for research purposes. 45 
C.F.R. § 164.514(e) (specifying that protected health information may be disclosed for, inter 
alia, research purposes, so long as the information released contains only a limited data set 
and is released pursuant to a data use agreement between researcher and covered entity (but 
not the individual whose information is at issue)). 
114. 45 C.F.R. § 46.123 (2008); see also id § 46.113 (providing for suspension or termi-
nation of IRB approval of research where the requirements of the Common Rule are not 
met). 
115.42 U.S.C.S. § I 320d-5(a) (Lexis 2009). 
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been few and far between. I 16 Recent amendments to HIPAA enacted 
as part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act permit state 
attorneys general to bring enforcement actions 117 and require the fed-
eral government to act in limited instances. 118 It is too soon to tell 
whether and how effective these statutory changes will be. Mean-
while, courts have generally held that the relevant regulations do not 
create private rights of action for third-party beneficiaries of govern-
ment regulations (i.e., research subjects ).119 
State law often provides similarly slim protection. As of January 
2008, just more than half of U.S. states required informed consent to 
disclose genetic information. 12o Only eight required informed consent 
for the retention of genetic information. 121 And while five states af-
firmatively recognize genetic information as the personal property of 
the individual from whom that information derives,122 at least two of 
these (Colorado and Georgia) nonetheless permit the research use of 
.. c . . h 123 genetIc 1ll10rmatlOn Wit out consent. 
This leaves tissue providers facing recourse to private law sys-
tems to protect their interests. 
A. Informational Property 
1. Defining Informational Property 
Informational property recognizes a limited right to control how 
the information contained within one's cells is used. 124 This approach 
116. Kendra Gray, The Privacy Rule: Are We Being Deceived?, 11 DEPAULJ. HEALTH 
CARE L. 89, 89 (2007) ("Since the implementation of the Privacy Rule, the U.S. Department 
of Health and Human Services ('HHS'), Office for Civil Rights ('OCR') has received thou-
sands of complaints, but has not imposed a single civil fine and has prosecuted only two 
criminal cases."). 
117.42 U.S.C.S. § \320d-5(e) ("Enforcement by State attorneys general"). 
118. Id. § \320d-5( c) ("Noncompliance due to willful neglect"). 
119. See, e.g., Wright v. Fred Hutchinson Cancer Research Ctr., 269 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 
1289 (W.O. Wash. 2002) (holding that there is no private right of action under the Common 
Rule). Case law is also clear that where Congress did not intend to create rights enforceable 
in private actions, there is no basis for a judicial remedy. See Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 
U.S. 273, 286 (2002) ("[W]here the text and structure of a statute provide no indication that 
Congress intends to create new individual rights, there is no basis for a private sui!."). 
120. Nat'l Conference of State Legislatures, Genetic Privacy Laws, Jan. 2008, 
http://www .ncsl.orgldefaul!.aspx?tabid= 14287. 
121. Id. (Alaska, Delaware, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, 
and Oregon). 
122.1d. (Alaska, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, and Louisiana). 
123. COLO. REV. STAT. § 10-3-1104.7(5)(2009); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-54-6 (2009). In 
addition, Florida's genetic testing statute has been interpreted as providing little protection 
in the context of genetic research. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Ins!., 
Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1069, 1075 (S.D. Fla. 2003) (discussing FLA. STAT. § 760.40 in 
the context of informed consent and conversion claims). 
124. Others have also explored the propertization of information. See, e.g., Jacqueline 
Lipton, Information Property: Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. \35, 136-37 
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adopts the contours of American intellectual property. In particular, a 
rights regime adapted from copyright appears to capture many of the 
needs and interests to be protected in research involving human tissue. 
Unlike tangible property, copyright cannot be lost through uncon-
scious abandonment during its statutory period. 125 Moreover, copy-
right attaches even to unpublished (i.e., undisclosed) works. 126 
Personal genetic information protected by a copyright-like informa-
tional property right would thus be unavailable for unauthorized use 
no matter how or from where it was obtained. 
A critical caveat, however, is that close genetic relatives may 
serve as a source of tissue and genetic information, even if a particular 
individual will not. In the absence of some form of familial or even 
community-based agreement, substantial amounts of one's individual-
izing genetic information may be compiled through the collection of 
tissue samples from related individuals, notwithstanding one's per-
sonal consent. Nonetheless, researchers working within an informa-
tional property regime would be unable to access a particular person's 
genetic information directly in the absence of appropriate permission. 
Moreover, in instances in which an individual's tissue is valuable be-
cause of a unique, non-shared mutation, informational property rights 
would provide true protection from unauthorized access to the desired 
gene sequence. 
Informational property controls would likewise persist even in 
downstream creations like digitized genetic sequences, as the informa-
tion contained in such records would be identical to that of the origi-
nal cells, even if their forms were different. 127 Cell lines might also be 
subject to informational property controls where a tissue provider's 
genetic sequence and the genetic sequence of a cell line are similar in 
material ways.128 This assignment of rights and the now-common 
(2004) (listing sources); Pamela Samuelson, Information as Property: Do Ruckelshaus and 
Carpenter Signal a Changing Direction in Intellectual Property Law?, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 
365 (1989); cf Joseph Blocher, Reputation as Property in Virtual Economies, 118 YALE 
LJ. POCKET PART 120 (2009), http://thepocketpart.org/2009/01119lblocher.html(describing 
intangible reputation as the object of property rights). 
125. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(c) (2006) (guaranteeing copyright protection for works that are 
published anonymously or under pseudonyms); see also infra text accompanying notes 251-
55 (describing how traditional property can be abandoned and used without regard to the 
prior owner' s interests). 
126. 17 U.S.C. § 104(a) (2006). 
127. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes?, AM. J. BIOETHICS, Summer 
2002, at 3, 9 (discussing genetic information stored in computer-readable format). 
128. Cell lines are a complicated downstream creation to analyze in the informational 
property framework. The value of a cell line lies in the extent to which it maintains the 
genome of the original provider. In this sense, informational property controls oUght to 
extend to cell lines as well because they target the same genetic information. But cell lines 
are often substantially genetically different from the cells of the original human provider. 
This stems in part from the way in which cell lines are created - by fusing a kind of cancer 
cell with the provider's cells. The result is that the cells of a cell line may have entire chro-
mosomes from the cancer cell, and they may lose entire chromosomes from the initial pro-
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practice of patenting human genes are not necessarily mutually exclu-
sive. 129 Just as downstream inventors must often obtain licenses to 
make use of upstream patented works, researchers would also need to 
obtain prior consent from the individuals whose tissues and genetic 
information form the basis for their research. 130 
Although this model builds on an analogy to American intellec-
tual property, the synonymy of these two constructs is inexact. Indi-
viduals invest no creativity in creating their genetic information, while 
at least a modicum of creativity is generally required in intellectual 
property.l3l Nonetheless, adopting and adapting the language and 
rights of intellectual property for personal genetic information has 
intuitive appeal, as it attaches a property-like right to the most valu-
able part of tissue samples - the information they contain. 132 
Moreover, both the proposed informational property right in per-
sonal genetic information and intellectual property rights arise at least 
in part for the instrumental reason that they encourage innovation and 
vider. Moreover, the genomes of cell lines often develop numerous mutations over time, 
including large duplications or deletions of genetic material. See Chad A. Cowan et aI., 
Derivation oj Embryonic Stem-Cell Lines Jrom Human Blastocysts, 350 NEW ENG. J. MED. 
1353, 1355 (2004) (noting that after prolonged culture several cell lines displayed trisomy 
(three copies) of chromosome 12, as well as other changes). For purposes of this Article, a 
cell line will be considered as falling within the scope of a tissue provider's informational 
property protections so long as the cell line contains genetic sequences from the provider's 
cells that are individualizing. This Article will denominate such cell lines as "similar in 
material ways" or "materially similar." In other words, as stated above, where a tissue pro-
vider's genetic sequence and the genetic sequence of a cell line are materially similar, the 
informational property protections affixed to the former extend to the latter. 
129. On the patenting of the human genome, see Jensen & Murray, supra note 80, at 239, 
which reports that twenty percent of the human genome has already been patented, with 
some genes subject to as many as twenty patents. 
130. Although informational property rights would not necessarily be in direct conflict 
with current patent practices, recognizing informational property rights in genetic informa-
tion emphasizes the difficulties that arise when patents are available for unmodified gene 
sequences. Informational property rights might thus provide another reason for doing away 
with these problematic patents. Gene patents have been subject to criticism by "professional 
medical organizations, Nobel Prize winners, government officials, religious leaders, and 
bioethics councils." Eileen M. Kane, Splitting the Gene: DNA Patents and the Genetic 
Code, 71 TENN. L. REV. 707, 727 (2004); see also Complaint, Ass'n for Molecular Pathol-
ogy v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, No. 09CV4515 (S.D.N.Y. May 12,2009); Lori B. 
Andrews, Genes and Patent Policy: Rethinking Intellectual Property Rights, 3 NATURE 
REvs. GENETICS 803, 803-05 (2002) (addressing the negative impact gene patenting may 
have on research, medical treatments, and disease diagnosis); Symposium, Probing the 
Human Genome: Who Owns Genetic Information?, 4 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 2 (1998) 
(transcribing panel presentations discussing the issue of gene patenting and ownership). 
131. See inJra text accompanying notes 248-49. 
132. See Buchanan, supra note 43, at 8-6 ("[FJrom the standpoint of many of the inter-
ests at stake in the way biological samples are used, what is most import [sic J is the infor-
mation the sample can yield, not the physical embodiment of the information."); cf Pilar 
Ossorio, Legal and Ethical Issues in Biotechnology Patenting, in A COMPANION TO 
GENETHICS: PHILOSOPHY AND THE GENETICS REVOLUTION 408, 416 (2002) (recognizing 
that the role of DNA as information carrier comes closest to linking human dignity concerns 
to objections to genetic research patenting). 
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investment in research. 133 Patent and copyright reward successful in-
novation and so encourage would-be inventors to invest their time and 
resources in hopes of securing certain time-limited exclusive rights 
with respect to the result. Informational property rights would encour-
age investment in research in two senses: first, by enabling individuals 
to provide their tissues for research use with confidence that their in-
terests will be respected ("investment" as resources); and second, by 
increasing public trust in the ethical conduct of scientific research 
("investment" as both public resources and emotional energy). 
2. Informational Property as a Personal Right 
Generally, intellectual property may be committed to the com-
mons, or rights to it may be assigned to specific individuals or institu-
tions. 134 Given that the vast majority of human genetic data is 
identical - indeed, the genetic makeup of even non-related individu-
als differs only by hundredths of a percentage135 - it may be attrac-
tive to conceptualize this information as a commons to which all have 
equal access and to which none may assert a preferential right of ac-
cess or control. 136 A total genetics common, however, would also 
permit indiscriminate use of any DNA for any purpose. Such an ap-
133. Much of American intellectual property law arises by operation of the Constitution's 
Progress Clause, which grants Congress the power to "promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to 
use their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis 
added). 
134. See Jasper A. Bovenberg, Mining the Common Heritage of Our DNA: Lessons 
Learned from Grotius and Pardo, 2006 DUKE L. & TECH. REv. 8, 'V'V 9-12, 
www.law.duke.edu/journals/dltr/articles/pdf/2006DL TR0008.pdf (delineating the ancient 
categories of non-private property - res nullius, res communis, and res publicae - and 
describing whether and under what circumstances such property becomes private). A third 
type of ownership may also arise: a semicommons, in which "a resource is owned and used 
in common for one major purpose, but, with respect to some other major purpose, individual 
economic units - individuals, families, or firms - have property rights to separate pieces 
of the commons." Henry E. Smith, Semicommon Property Rights and Scattering in the 
Open Fields, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 131, 131 (2000). 
135. Human Genome Project Information, SNP Fact Sheet, http://www.ornl.gov/scil 
techresourceslHuman _ Genome/faq/snps.shtml (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) [hereinafter SNP 
Fact Sheet] ("[M]ore than 99% of human DNA sequences are the same"). What is more, 
protein-coding DNA comprises barely two percent of the human genome, with vast 
stretches of non-coding DNA in between. Elizabeth Pennisi, DNA Study Forces Rethink of 
What It Means to Be a Gene, 316 SCIENCE 1556, 1556 (2007). 
136. See, e.g., JOHN SULSTON & GEORGINA FERRY, THE COMMON THREAD: A STORY OF 
SCIENCE, POLITICS, ETHICS, AND THE HUMAN GENOME (2002) (providing an insider's per-
spective on the Human Genome Project and arguing for keeping the human genome an 
unpatented commons); HUMAN GENOME ORG. ETHICS COMM., supra note 83 (adopting four 
principles for any recommendations HUGO makes, including "[r]ecognition that the human 
genome is part of the common heritage of humanity"). This sort of commons might best be 
classified as a public trust, rather than as common possession. See Pilar N. Ossorio, The 
Human Genome as Common Heritage: Common Sense or Legal Nonsense?, 35 J.L. MED. & 
ETHICS 425, 437 (2007). 
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proach is inconsistent with a commitment to tissue provider control 
over the use of one's genetic information in research - especially 
genetic information that is personally identifying and identity form-
ing. 
Instead, the informational property approach considers genetic in-
formation to be the property of the individual from whom it was ob-
tained. 137 Genetic information plays a role in self-identity and may 
contain indications about one's present and future self-indeed, this 
is one reason why unauthorized use of one's genetic material is often 
perceived as offensive to human dignity. Like a right to control the 
use of one's likeness,138 a right to control the use of one's genetic ma-
terial would flow from a personal right that arises without the specific 
intent or perhaps innovation of the rights holder. Under an informa-
tional property rights regime, unwanted uses or disclosures of genetic 
information may be prevented ex ante, and unauthorized uses or dis-
closures could be remedied ex pOSt.1 39 
3. Operationalizing Informational Property: Copyleft Licensing 
Under a system of personal informational property rights, any re-
searcher wishing to gain access to the information contained in an 
individual's cells would need to obtain a license from that individual. 
Such a license would fill much the same role that an informed consent 
document plays in our current system - a license authorizes access to 
and use of the desired material. 140 A license may be proprietary, 
137. As discussed in more detail below, the shared nature of genetic information calls for 
different forms of control over genetic information that is shared by all persons as compared 
with genetic information that is personal and may be identifying to a specific individual. See 
infra text accompanying notes 16.6--74. 
138. See Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 
1953) (coining the term "right of publicity"). 
139. See Ira V. Heffan, Note, Copyleft: Licensing Collaborative Works in the Digital 
Age, 49 STAN. L. REv. 1487, 1509-10 (1997) ("Courts have held that an author can pursue 
claims of copyright infringement if a licensee makes use of the author's work in a manner 
that is outside the scope of the license."); see also Costello Publ'g Co. v. Rotelle, 670 F.2d 
1035, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1981); Gilliam v. Am. Broad. Cos., 538 F.2d 14, 20-21 (2d Cir. 
1976); Microsoft Corp. v. Very Competitive Computer Prods., 671 F. Supp. 1250, 1257 n.4 
(N.D. Cal. 1987). Where no license was obtained, forced tissue providers would likewise 
have a claim similar to copyright infringement. 
140. We should, of course, distinguish between the process of facilitating informed con-
sent and the documentation of that consent (here, as a license) when given. Informed con-
sent is meant to be a process that enables individuals to understand the nature of the 
research in which they are invited to participate and the ways in which that research mayor 
may not advance their own goals and life plans. See Ram, supra note 20, at 259--62 (de-
scribing the ethical demands of informed consent). See generally RUTH R. FADEN, TOM L. 
BEAUCHAMP & NANCY M. P. KING, A HISTORY AND THEORY OF INFORMED CONSENT 
(1986). It may be appropriate to think about informed consent documents both as memorial-
izing the informed consent process and as a legal document setting forth the terms of a 
limited license. The point, however, is that constructing informed consent documents to 
serve also as licenses or other legal documents should not override the primary function of 
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meaning that the rights holder has "all rights reserved," and that each 
downstream researcher must obtain permission from the rights holder 
to use, copy, modify, or distribute the protected material. 141 Alterna-
tively, licenses may be open source and "copyleft" in nature, meaning 
that the rights holder has "some rights reserved," and that downstream 
researchers may freely use, copy, modify, and distribute the protected 
material subject to specific restrictions enumerated in the license.142 In 
particular, a copyleft license generally requires "any derivative work 
made from the copy left-licensed work be itself licensed under the 
same copyleft license, preserving all the same rights and responsibili-
ties the original licensee had to downstream licensees.,,143 In the con-
text of tissue provision, this kind of "viral licensing" provision would 
reinforce tissue providers' ability to exercise their interests with re-
spect to derivative works, such as cell lines or commercial prod-
uctS. 144 
Again, researchers may be able to "route around" individual tis-
sue providers by obtaining tissue from genetic relatives, which raises 
questions about whether and how familial or community consent 
ought to be required in some instances. For present purposes, protect-
ing informational property rights means, at a minimum, protecting the 
human dignity of individuals by preventing their individually-
identifying genetic information from being used in research to which 
they object. The use of genetically similar, though non-identical, tis-
sues in research may therefore cause family conflict, but does not 
constitute an affront to respect for human dignity. Identical siblings, 
of course, complicate this picture. 
informed consent - enabling individuals to act in an informed manner according to their 
interests. 
141. See Brian w. Carver, Note, Share and Share Alike: Understanding and Enforcing 
Open Source and Free Software Licenses, 20 BERKELEY TECH. LJ. 443, 454 (2005) (de-
scribing the rights associated with copyright ownership). 
142. Jd. The primary providers of open source, copyleft licenses are Creative Commons 
and the GNU Project. See Creative Commons, http://creativecommons.org (last visited Dec. 
20, 2009) (providing open source licenses for many kinds of copyrighted works); GNU 
Project Licenses, http://www.gnu.org/licenses/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (providing open 
source licenses for computer software). 
143. Carver, supra note 141, at 453. 
144. Throughout this Article, "derivative works" refers to physically distinct, but infor-
mationally similar cellular or other products. Enzymes or hormones produced by a particular 
tissue sample would constitute a derivative work of this kind, as would cell lines (at least 
those in which the genetic sequence of the cell line and the tissue provider's genetic se-
quence are materially similar). So too would digitally rendered genetic sequences. Techni-
cally speaking, children could be considered derivative works of their parents-
downstream genetic "products" that arose through the combination of chromosomes from 
each genetic parent. However, this Article will not include genetic relatives, who share 
many of the same genes, among derivative works. At least with respect to this derivative 
works component, each individual remains free to consent to the use of or refuse to provide 
tissue for research purposes, independent of the choices of her relatives. 
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If proprietary rights were asserted, recognizing informational 
property rights for tissue providers would be likely in many instances 
to disserve the broader interests of tissue providers, as well as of re-
searchers and society, in facilitating research. Proprietary informa-
tional property rights to one's personal genetic information may 
exacerbate anticommons problems in biomedical research by adding 
another rights holder from whom authorization must be obtained and 
to whom licensing fees may have to be paid before research may 
commence. 145 
Open-source licensing systems, by contrast, may avoid this sig-
nificant pitfall by adopting standardized kinds of authorization that 
can be granted or withheld, and by doing so one time, rather than re-
quiring each potential user of protected material to negotiate inde-
pendently with a rights holder. Creative Commons licensing, for 
example, permits combinations of four kinds of conditions limiting 
the use of protected material by downstream users: attribution ("BY"), 
noncommercial ("NC"), no derivatives (''ND''), and share alike 
("SA,,).146 These conditions signal the sorts of interests that matter to 
individuals engaging in creative activities generally protected by 
copyright. 
The interests of tissue providers serve as analogous bases for 
formulating conditions that might be available in an open-source li-
censing system for tissue provision. 147 Although the number and types 
of conditions might expand beyond those recognized by Creative 
Commons, the range of possible conditions could nonetheless be cab-
ined and standardized by policy or guideline. For example, the pro-
vider's interest in control might be achieved through restrictions 
placed on the types of research for which a tissue sample may be 
used. Such restrictions might include the possibility that the tissue 
sample may only be used for the specific project for which it was pro-
145. On the problem of the anticommons in biomedical research, see Heller & Eisenberg, 
supra note 17. 
146. Creative Commons Licenses, http://creativecommons.org/aboutllicenses (last visited 
Dec. 20, 2009). An "attribution" condition allows others to "copy, distribute, display, and 
perform your copyrighted work - and derivative works based upon it - but only if they 
give credit the way you request." Id. A "noncommercial" condition allows others to "copy, 
distribute, display, and perform your work - and derivative works based upon it - but for 
noncommercial purposes only." Id. A "no derivatives" condition allows others to "copy, 
distribute, display, and perform only verbatim copies of your work, not derivative works 
based upon it." Id. A "share alike" condition allows others to "distribute derivative works 
only under a license identical to the license that governs your work." Id. 
147. Creative Commons has already embarked on a related project aimed at spreading the 
open-source, Creative Commons approach to collaborative research to biomedical research. 
See Science Commons, http://sciencecommons.org/ (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). The Sci-
ence Commons project, however, seeks to expand Creative Commons licensing among 
researchers without specific reference to the interests of those providing the raw materials 
for research. See Science Commons Biological Materials Transfer Project, http:// 
sciencecommons.org/projectsllicensing/index.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
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vided while also requiring that those limitations persist where cells or 
other products derived from the original sample move among re-
searchers. Interests in confidentiality could give rise to conditions 
respecting the anonymization of tissue samples and the disclosure of 
identifying genetic information. These conditions might also include 
provisions for the retention of linked records to enable therapeutically 
helpful information to be relayed from researcher to tissue provider. 
And while the Creative Commons noncommercial condition enables 
creators only to prohibit commercial uses of their works (and deriva-
tive products based on those works), licenses for tissue research might 
expand the scope of discretion granted to tissue providers. Under this 
formulation, tissue providers could elect to prohibit commercializa-
tion - or at least restrictive patent enforcement - of derivative 
products outright or, alternatively, elect to require benefit-sharing of 
the fruits of those products. 
The noncommercial condition in Creative Commons licensing has 
been the source of considerable controversy. This controversy springs 
primarily from the difficulty of teasing apart "commercial" from 
"noncommercial" uses in today's "interlocking personal and profes-
sionallives.,,148 These sorts of line-drawing problems could similarly 
bedevil a noncommercial designation in the informational property 
context. For instance, is research "commercial" only when conducted 
by for-profit companies? Or would non-profit organizations, such as 
universities, also run afoul of a noncommercial designation through 
patenting research results? Is patenting the locus of commercializa-
tion? And are all sales in connection with human tissue research 
equally "commercial" in nature? 
In a white paper on licensing university technology, leading U.S. 
research universities, in conjunction with the Association of American 
Medical Colleges, offered one possible definition of noncommercial 
research purposes: "Use of PATENT RIGHTS for academic research 
or other not-for-profit or scholarly purposes which are undertaken at a 
non-profit or governmental institution that does not use PATENT 
RIGHTS in the production or manufacture of products for sale or the 
performance of services for a fee.,,149 This definition, of course, pre-
sumes the existence and propriety of patent rights. As such, adopting 
this definition would do little to address the objections of those who 
148. Gordon Haff, Does the Noncommercial Creative Commons License Make Sense?, 
CNET NEWS, Nov. 27, 2007, http://news.cnet.coml8301-13556_3-9823336-6I.html; cf 
Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (construing the well-accepted 
experimental-use exemption in patent law by observing that academic research conducted at 
Duke University "unmistakably further[s) the institution's legitimate business objectives, 
including educating and enlightening students and faculty participating in these projects"). 
149. CAL. INST. TECH. ET AL., IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST: NINE POINTS TO CONSIDER IN 
LICENSING UNIVERSITY TECHNOLOGY 10-11 (2007), http://news-service.stanford.edul 
news12007 Imarch 7/gifs/whitepaper.pdf. 
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oppose all market alienability of human tissue. 150 These questions 
indicate the manifold difficulties of navigating the commercialization 
aspect of genetic and other tissue research. They need not, however, 
dissuade us from looking to Creative Commons in thinking about how 
best to structure an informational property licensing system. 
The Creative Commons system also provides a baseline from 
which to analogize an appropriate right to withdraw. The right to 
withdraw is an important facet of the power to exercise one's ongoing 
interests in the use of one's cells and genetic information in research. 
Although Creative Commons licenses are not generally revocable,151 
"[y]ou can stop distributing your work under a Creative Commons 
license at any time you wish; but this will not withdraw any copies of 
your work that already exist under a Creative Commons license from 
circulation .... ,,152 As Creative Commons licensing is adapted to suit 
the needs and interests of tissue providers and researchers, the right to 
prevent future access to the original cell sample might be protected, 
even as continued use of derivative products within the bounds of the 
original license might be permitted. This middle ground position 
seems likely to reassure tissue providers that their interests are suffi-
ciently respected, while also reassuring researchers that their research 
materials, and especially derived cell lines and cultures, will not be 
b· b' . 153 su ~ect to ar Itrary revocation. 
Limiting and standardizing the types of conditions that rights 
holders may place on their protected materials would also assist in the 
movement of materials and derivative products without the enormous 
transaction costs likely to be incurred where an unlimited number of 
restrictions may be imposed.1 54 Standardized conditions, however, 
also ensure significantly more control over the future use of one's 
protected genetic material than a blanket license would provide. 155 
150. See supra notes 71-76 and accompanying text. 
151. Creative Commons Baseline Rights, http://creativecommons.orglBaseline_Rights 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2009) ("Every license ... is not revocable. "). 
152. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions, http://wiki.creativecommons.orgl 
FAQ#WhaUU_change_mLmind.3F (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
153. This right to withdraw is, in fact, similar to the right to withdraw that the Eighth 
Circuit protected in Catalona. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 675 (8th Cir. 
2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008). 
154. The notion that limited forms serve the interests of society through limiting transac-
tion costs is a familiar one in property, where the numerus clausus (meaning "the number is 
closed") principle recognizes the imperative for limited types of land transfer. See Thomas 
W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: The Nume-
rus Clausus Principle, 11 0 YALE L.J. I, 3-4 (2000). 
155. Most tissue for research is originally collected for clinical use following, at most, 
blanket consent to the future use of the tissue for research purposes. See WEIR & OLICK, 
supra note 81, at 169. In many instances, no consent at all is obtained for research use of 
excised tissues, and researchers treat the tissues as abandoned by the patient. See id Some 
scholars advocate continuing to collect only blanket consent. See. e.g., Chen et aI., supra 
note 45, at 652 (suggesting that binary consent forms that allow participants to authorize or 
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Indeed, Creative Commons and other open-source/copy left mecha-
nisms are suggestive of a tiered informed consent approach. Tiered 
consent documents present potential tissue providers with a menu of 
research categories to which they may consent. 156 Potential tissue 
providers may consent to some, all, or none of the research categories 
presented, facilitating provider choice while constraining that choice 
to a manageable set of options. By standardizing the range of research 
categories to which tissue providers may consent and obtaining this 
consent upfront, tiered consent assuages many of the concerns identi-
fied by courts and regulators declining to impose consent require-
h b ·· . fi h 157 ments on t ose 0 tammg tIssue or researc purposes. 
Tiered consent is most likely to be encountered in cancer re-
search, where the National Cancer Institute has formally recom-
d d f · d .. b . 158 P . men e use 0 tIere consent m Its est practices. atlents 
undergoing biopsy or surgery are routinely asked to provide their ex-
cised tissues for research purposes.159 Consent for such provision of-
ten takes the form of tiered consent presenting three options: 
1. My tissue may be kept for use in research to 
learn about, prevent, or treat cancer. 
[YeslNo] 
2. My tissue may be kept for use in research to 
learn about, prevent or treat other health 
problems (for example: diabetes, Alz-
heimer's disease, or heart disease). [YeslNo] 
refuse all future research "might allow individuals to control use of their samples, simplify 
consent forms, and allow important research to proceed"). 
156. See Natalie Ram, Regulating Consent to Human Embryo Research: A Critique of 
Health Canada's Proposal, 14 HEALTH L. REv. 19,22-25 (2005) (describing and compar-
ing blanket, tiered, and project-specific models for obtaining and documenting informed 
consent for the third-party use of human eggs, and recommending tiered consent as the 
model that best accommodates the interests of egg providers and the imperatives of re-
search). 
157. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text. Cf Mary Anderlik Majumder, Cy-
berbanks and Other Virtual Research Repositories, 33 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 31, 33 (2005) 
(discussing a planned database program including "a taxonomy for expressing varying 
degrees of consent constraining potential use of individual specimens"). 
158. See NAT'L CANCER INST., MODEL CONSENT FORM FOR USE OF TISSUE FOR 
RESEARCH, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimens/model.pdf (last visited Dec. 
20,2009) [hereinafter MODEL CONSENT FORM] (setting forth the model informed consent 
document for the National Cancer Institute); NAT'L CANCER INST., PATIENT INFORMATION 
SHEET, http://www.cancerdiagnosis.nci.nih.gov/specimens/patient.pdf (last visited Dec. 20, 
2009) [hereinafter PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET] (offering a model consent form distrib-
uted to, but not necessarily used by, doctors). 
159. See Brief for Am. Cancer Soc'y as Amicus Curiae Supporting Plaintiff-Appellee at 
8, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 FJd 667 (8th CiT. 2007) (Nos. 06-2286 & 06-2301) ("It is 
common ... for cancer patients undergoing biopsy or surgery involving removal of malig-
nant or benign tissue to consent to a small amount of the tissue being stored for later re-
search."); PATIENT INFORMATION SHEET, supra note 158. 
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3. Someone from ~ may contact me in the 
future to ask me to take part in more re-
search. [Yes/No]160 
151 
Like open-source licensing, tiered consent establishes boundaries 
for permissible downstream use in one consent event rather than re-
peated interactions. While tiered consent could likely be successfully 
employed in tort, contract, or property models as well, the informa-
tional property model, drawing from intellectual property and the 
open-source/copyleft approach specifically, appears uniquely well-
suited to its implementation. The fact that numerous kinds of intellec-
tual property have already been licensed in this fashion provides fur-
ther reason to believe that such an approach would be successful. 161 
This is not to say that proprietary rights would not be useful in 
some instances. The privacy of tissue providers may be well protected 
through enforcement of a proprietary rights regime governing the 
linking of specific tissue samples to specific individuals and their 
medical records. Similar to digital rights management, a system of 
informational rights management would prevent certain kinds of ac-
cess or access to certain kinds of information. 162 Access to data link-
ing genetic profiles to identifiable individuals could be prevented by a 
series of security measures like firewalls, minimizing the risk of unau-
thorized disclosure of identifying genetic information. Informational 
rights management systems would therefore be exactly what they 
sound like: systems for managing access to information for the pur-
pose of protecting tissue providers' informational property rights. It is 
not now necessary to specify the precise form that such informational 
rights management systems should take (and indeed it would likely be 
unwise to do so at this time). It is enough to recognize that a proprie-
tary informational property right to identifying information supported 
by informational rights management measures would enhance tissue 
160. MODEL CONSENT FORM, supra note 158; see also Ram, supra note 20, at 267. 
161. Creative Commons licenses are already in use for text, audio, images, video, and 
educational works, among others. Creative Commons Frequently Asked Questions:, 
http://wiki.creativecommons.org/F AQ#Is _Creative_Commons _ building_ a_database _ oC 
licensed _ content.3F (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
162. Digital rights management (DRM) systems are 
[Sjophisticated software lock-out systems that prevent access to digi-
tized content except on the tenns dictated by the owner. Such content 
management software ... may govern a wide range of user behaviors, 
such as the number of times a work may be accessed, the duration of 
access, the ability to reproduce or transmit the work, and the payment 
schedule for additional access. 
Dan L. Burk, DNA Rules: Legal and Conceptual Implications of Biological "Lock-Out" 
Systems, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1553, 1563 (2004). Burk discusses DRM in the context of dis-
cussing biological "locks" embedded in the DNA of genetically engineered seeds, which 
raises a host of legal, ethical, and social questions quite apart from those discussed in this 
Article. 
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providers' ability to control the disclosure of identifying information 
about them to others. 
4. Operationalizing Informational Property: Fair Utilization 
Adopting a legal regime analogous to intellectual property for 
protecting personal genetic information is not without difficulties. For 
one, copyright's fair use doctrine threatens to undermine the whole 
project of providing effective protection of the interests of tissue pro-
viders in research. As a matter of statutory (and perhaps constitu-
tional) law, fair use permits the use of copyrighted materials without 
authorization for identified (socially useful) purposes. 163 Indeed, fair 
use is a complete defense against infringement claims, protecting 
downstream creators' rights to use another's intellectual property even 
when such use is offensive to the rights holder. 164 Were the fair use 
exceptions of copyright applied wholesale in the context of informa-
tional property rights, it is likely that some, if not all, human tissue 
research would be construed as fair use. 165 
Properly formulated, however, a fair use cognate may in fact en-
courage adoption of an informational property model and provide use-
ful balance between tissue providers' interests and the free flow of 
research materials. A limited "fair utilization" exception to informa-
tional property rights might include research aimed at discovering 
information about the regions of DNA that all persons have in com-
mon. This approach would permit generally unobjectionable research 
163. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2006) (pennitting fair use of copyrighted material for purposes of 
"criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including mUltiple copies for classroom 
use), scholarship, or research"). Section 107 specifies that whether fair use exists in a par-
ticular case will be detennined on the basis of four factors: 
(I) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use 
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes; (2) 
the nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the amount and substantiality 
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; 
and (4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of 
the copyrighted work. 
Id. As a matter of constitutional law, "the Supreme Court has never held that fair use is 
constitutionally required, although some isolated statements in its opinions might arguably 
be enlisted for such a requirement." Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 
458 (2d Cir. 2001). On this point, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 
575 (1994) ("From the infancy of copyright protection, some opportunity for fair use of 
copyrighted materials has been thought necessary to fulfill copyright's very purpose, '[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts .... '" (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 
8)). Corley itself sidestepped the issue of the constitutional origin of fair use. Corley, 273 
F.3d at 458-59. 
164. See White v. Samsung Elecs. Am., Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513-14 (9th Cir. 1993) 
(Kozinski, J., dissenting) (describing the need for limits on intellectual property rights in the 
interests of society and the promotion of investment in innovation). 
165. Statutory fair use permits unauthorized use of copyrighted works for educational, 
scholarly, and research purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 107. At the very least, academic research 
would largely fall within the scope of fair use. 
No.1] Human Tissue Research 153 
to proceed with fewer hurdles while maintaining adequate protection 
for the interests of tissue providers where such protection is desirable. 
None of the genetic information obtained would be unique to a single 
individual, and therefore confidentiality concerns would be minimized 
while control concerns would not be significantly undermined. For 
those who harbor religious or other objections to any use of their tis-
sue in research, the opportunity to opt out of fair utilization might be 
sufficient and practicable.166 In any event, since nearly all tissue col-
lected for some research would likely be used in multiple projects, 
most tissue providers would have the opportunity to make their pref-
erences known through a more complete licensing procedure, such as 
the tiered consent licensing system described above. These licenses 
would enable tissue providers to permit the use of their tissues for 
some, but not all, types of research. 
The line between shared and unique regions of human DNA is 
not, unfortunately, one that is simple to draw. 167 There is a great deal 
that we do not know about genetics and genomes. 168 Consider, for 
instance, a recent study examining just one percent of "the human 
genome." Although only two percent of the genome consists of pro-
tein-coding DNA, eighty percent of the bases studied "showed signs 
of being expressed.,,169 And while biologists have often assumed that 
genes are compact, the new research indicates that "genes can be 
sprawling, with far-flung protein-coding and regulatory regions that 
overlap with other genes.,,170 These findings "suggest that a multidi-
mensional network regulates gene expression" and that researchers 
need to be more thoughtful in how they think about genes as opposed 
to non-coding DNA.171 Additionally, the notion of "the human ge-
nome" is a fiction: "The international Human Genome Project con-
structed a representative sequence of human DNA by piecing together 
166. Opting out of fair use is not possible in copyright. The needs of an infonnational 
property rights system, however, are not identical to those of a copyright system. For the 
reasons set forth in Part ILA, supra, fair utilization, including an opportunity to opt out of 
such utilization, represents a better accommodation of the interests present in human tissue 
research than would be available in a system with an irrevocable fair use exception. 
167. Even the distinction between human and nonhuman genes is slippery: 
[M]any genes that occur in human populations also occur in primate, 
mammalian, and other animal populations. It would be a mistake to 
think of human genes as genes that occur only in human populations, 
since many genes that play an important role in nonhuman popula-
tions also play an important role in cellular regulation, growth, devel-
opment, and physiology in human populations. 
David B. Resnik, The Morality of Human Gene Patents, 7 KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. 43, 44 
(1997) (citations omitted). Resnik advocates categorizing a gene as a human gene "if and 
only if it contributes to the structures or functions of human beings." Id. 
168. See generally Pennisi, supra note 135 (noting questions raised by a DNA study). 
169.Id. at 1556. 
170.Id. 
171. Id. at 1557. 
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information from many different individuals.,,172 The result is that 
researchers will not always know, ex ante, whether a region of the 
genome that they wish to study could include an individualizing muta-
tion - theoretically, any region of DNA could include a non-
inherited mutation that arose during genetic recombination. In the face 
of this uncertainty, the best way forward might be to adopt a probabil-
istic approach that conditions the application of the fair utilization 
exception on a certain probability that the specific region of the ge-
nome under study might be unique. As more DNA and whole ge-
nomes are sequenced, our probability calculations will become better 
informed and more accurate, and the line between shared and unique 
human genomic domains will be more precise. 
If such a line can be drawn with sufficient precision, fair utiliza-
tion would yield at least three advantages to an informational property 
approach alone. First, like standardized categories for consent, fair 
utilization would further limit the transaction costs associated with 
human tissue research by limiting the circumstances in which more 
detailed informed consent authorization is required. Researchers ex-
ploring regions of DNA shared by all humans would face fewer per-
mission-seeking hurdles in accessing material for research, and fewer 
hurdles means fewer costs to research. 173 Second, incorporating fair 
utilization in an informational property system begins to grapple with 
the tensions that shared genetic identity present for traditional notions 
of private property. As suggested above, a commons-centered ap-
proach to human genetic information may in many ways appear at-
tractive because even non-related individuals differ at the genetic 
level only by tenths of a percent. 174 Fair utilization would open access 
to material for purposes of researching those portions of DNA that are 
shared among all humans - essentially creating a limited genetics 
common. Finally, fair utilization could bring commons-based and 
private-property approaches into harmony. By permitting individuals 
to opt out of fair utilization and to assert greater control where indi-
vidualizing genetic information may be at stake, the cabined nature of 
fair utilization provides more rigorous protection where tissue provid-
ers have a stronger stake in the research enterprise. 
172. Ossorio, supra note 136, at 432. 
173. See Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 17. The prospect of inexpensive, whole genome 
or large-scale sequencing suggests that the benefits of a fair utilization approach may be 
short-lived because whole genome sequences will inevitably contain some unique genetic 
information requiring more demanding tiered consent licensing. See Howard Wolinsky, The 
Thousand-Dollar Genome, 8 EMBO REP. 900, 902 (2007) (noting some research benefits of 
whole genome sequencing as opposed to genotyping on a smaller scale). Perhaps. The re-
search benefits of whole genome sequencing may in fact be so great that they outweigh the 
relative efficiency benefits of proceeding by way of fair utilization. Alternatively, it may be 
that the existence of the fair utilization exception will spur additional innovations designed 
to yield rapid, inexpensive, high-quality genetic sequencing in non-whole-genome fashion. 
174. See SNP Fact Sheet, supra note 135. 
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Existing rules suggest that a fair utilization exception such as the 
one suggested here is both possible and generally acceptable. The 
Common Rule currently permits IRBs to approve research conducted 
with limited or no consent in circumstances where risk of harm is mi-
nimal and obtaining consent is impracticable. 175 Other proposals for 
regulating consent and human tissue research have also distinguished 
generally unobjectionable research from research that may be objec-
tionable to a significant minority or lead to group-based harms. 176 
These existing or proposed standards suggest that the different con-
sent demanded where a fair utilization exception exists accords with 
our ethical sensibilities. 
Less tractable is research that makes use of human tissue as a raw 
material rather than as a source of information. The use of human 
cells as a substrate for growing cell lines or the use of human eggs 
(from which the genetic material has been purposefully removed) for 
cloning research might be permissible even in the absence of any li-
censing agreement from the tissue provider because the genetic in-
formation in the cells would not be the source of the sample's 
usefulness. l77 That said, some information contained within a cell is 
likely to be uncovered in nearly any research project, and as research-
ers learn more about how cell signaling occurs, they may uncover 
additional links between cellular information, over which tissue pro-
viders ought to have control, and research outcomes. 
Thus, the shortcomings of an informational property rights system 
are surmountable or, at worst, limited in scope. Informational property 
rights, in granting tissue providers greater control over the most valu-
able part of their tissue samples (personal genetic information), like-
wise grant tissue providers stronger means for protecting their 
interests in whether and how their cells are used in research. 
175.45 C.F.R. § 46.116(d) (2008). 
176. See Buchanan, supra note 43, at B-20 (proposing a system of general consent en-
hanced by project-specific consent where IRBs find "special scrutiny" appropriate); David 
Wendler, One-Time General Consent/or Research on Biological Samples, 166 ARCHIVES 
INTERNAL MED. 1449, 1451-52 (2006) (advocating a two-step approach by which individu-
als could authorize certain future uses of collected biological samples so long as "[t]he use 
of the [necessary] protected health information poses no more than minimal risk to indi-
viduals"). 
177. Like somatic cells, of course, eggs contain genetic information outside the nucleus 
in mitochondria. Mitochondrial DNA is not unique to a single individual but is shared by all 
matrilineal relatives. Nonetheless, it might be possible to attach informational property 
rights to this kind of DNA, thus requiring compliance with the informational property li-
censing system even where enucleated eggs are the tissue in question. 
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B. Integrating Informational Property with Existing Systems 
1. Tort 
Tort is a system of common law that imposes duties governing 
how we must treat one another in the absence of or even alongside 
other formally binding agreements like contracts or licenses. 178 To 
protect their interests within the law of torts, tissue providers ostensi-
bly look to the common-law doctrines of informed consent, breach of 
privacy, and, if interference with property rights is involved, conver-
sion. 
Informed consent is at the heart of tort's interaction with the prac-
tice of science and medicine. Where consent is inadequate or incom-
plete, patients and research participants have successfully brought tort 
claims arising under battery and negligence. 179 Medical professionals 
who perform procedures or engage in touching without authorization 
from patients/participants may face claims of battery.180 Likewise, 
where consent has been coerced in the context of medical treatment, 
tort doctrine dictates that such consent is invalid and a battery has 
occurred. 181 In most cases, however, medical professionals who fail to 
adequately disclose information material to decision making may be 
subject only to tort liability under negligence. 182 A successful negli-
178. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1626 (9th ed. 2009) (defining a tort as "[a] civil wrong, 
other than breach of contract, for which a remedy may be obtained, usu. in the form of dam-
ages; a breach of a duty that the law imposes on persons who stand in a particular relation to 
one another"). As Keeton once remarked, however, the concept of the "tort" defies simple 
definition: "[T]ort is a field which pervades the entire law, and is so interlocked at every 
point with property, contract and other accepted classifications that, as the student of law 
soon discovers, the categories are quite arbitrary." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND 
KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § I, at 2-3 (5th ed. 1984). 
179. See, e.g., Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001); 
Bryson v. Stone, 190 N.W.2d 336, 339 (Mich. Ct. App. 1971); Stover v. Ass'n of Thoracic 
& Cardiovascular Surgeons, 635 A.2d 1047, 1052-54 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1993). 
180. See, e.g., Bang v. Charles T. Miller Hosp., 88 N.W.2d 186, 190 (Minn. 1958) 
("[W]here a physician or surgeon can ascertain in advance of an operation alternative situa-
tions and no immediate emergency exists, a patient should be informed of the alternative 
possibilities and given a chance to decide before the doctor proceeds with the operation."); 
Isaac v. Jameson Mem'l Hosp., 932 A.2d 924, 929 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) ("A claim of a lack 
of informed consent sounds in the intentional tort of battery because an operation performed 
without the patient's consent is deemed to be the equivalent to a technical assault."). The 
most widely cited formulation of informed consent comes from an early-twentieth century 
opinion considering a battery claim. In Schloendorffv. Society o/the New York Hospital, 
Judge Cardozo stated, "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to 
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in damages." 105 
N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914), abrogated on other grounds by Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3 
(N.Y. 1957). 
181. JAMES F. DRANE, CLINICAL BIOETHICS: THEORY AND PRACTICE IN MEDICAL 
ETHICAL DECISION-MAKING 127 (1994). 
182. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 793 n.132 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (finding 
that "[t]he obligation to disclose is ... a part of the physician's general duty to exercise 
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gence claim must make four showings: first, that the researcher owed 
a duty of reasonable or greater care to the tissue provider; second, that 
this duty was breached; third, that the tissue provider suffered a cog-
nizable injury; and fourth, that the researcher's failure to act with due 
care was the proximate cause of the injury.IS3 
Present doctrine surrounding these required showings have made 
tort law largely unhelpful in protecting tissue providers. For instance, 
while it is well accepted that physicians have a duty of care to their 
patients that extends even into the research realm,184 whether re-
searchers interacting with tissue providers in a purely research rela-
tionship owe any similar duty of care is less obvious. In Greenberg, 
the district court held that the duty of informed consent could not be 
extended to require disclosure of a researcher's commercial inter-
ests. 185 Indeed, that court expended considerable energy in deciding 
whether researchers have any duty to obtain consent from tissue pro-
viders. 186 And the court did, in fact, conclude that no fiduciary rela-
tionship necessarily attaches when a researcher accepts human 
tissue. 18? 
Moreover, even where plaintiff tissue providers might make req-
uisite showings regarding duty and breach of duty, their claims may 
not succeed under current doctrine because their injuries are not gen-
erally cognizable in negligence. Negligence doctrine has a long his-
tory of employing narrow conceptions of "harm," emphasizing 
physical injuries over emotional ones. 188 Yet, once tissue is safely 
reasonable care for the benefit of his patient"); Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1106-07 
(Kan. 1960); FADEN ET AL., supra note 140, at 28-30 (describing the negligence theory of 
liability in informed consent doctrine). 
183. Ballantyne, supra note 24, at 578. 
184. In Moore, for instance, the California Supreme Court wrote: 
(I ) [A] physician must disclose personal interests unrelated to the pa-
tient's health, whether research or economic, that may affect the phy-
sician's professional judgment; and (2) a physician's failure to 
disclose such interests may give rise to a cause of action for perform-
ing medical procedures without informed consent or breach of fiduci-
ary duty. 
Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 483 (Cal. 1990). 
185. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1070-71 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also id at 1072 ("There is no automatic fiduciary relationship 
that attaches when a researcher accepts medical donations and the acceptance of trust, the 
second constitutive element of finding a fiduciary duty, cannot be assumed once a donation 
is given."). But see Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 858 (Md. 2001) 
(holding that "under certain circumstances, [informed consent agreements in nontherapeutic 
research projects] can, as a matter of law, constitute 'special relationships' giving rise to 
duties, out of the breach of which negligence actions may arise."). 
186. Greenberg, 264 F. Supp. 2d at 1068-70. The court concluded that "in certain cir-
cumstances a medical researcher does have a duty of informed consent[,]" but it did not 
identifY how one can identifY when this duty does or does not attach. Id at 1070. 
187.Id at 1072. 
188. Leslie Benton Sandor & Carol Berry, Recovery for Negligent Infliction of Emotional 
Distress Attendant to Economic Loss: A Reassessment, 37 ARIZ. L. REv. 1247, 1251-53 
(1995). The emphasis on physical injury or other proxies of emotional distress persists. 
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removed from the tissue provider's body, no physical harm befalls the 
tissue source directly as a result of research, no matter how that tissue 
is manipulated during research. 189 Likewise, dignitary torts, although 
recognized in some instances, are not traditionally protected in in-
formed consent doctrine. 190 The scope of harm that negligence pres-
ently embraces, therefore, is likely to exclude precisely the kinds of 
harms sustained by tissue providers whose interests in control, confi-
dentiality, and commercialization are not respected. 
Tort need not, however, be this obstructive of the interests of 
those providing tissue for research. The same reasoning that drives 
judges to recognize a duty of care between physicians and their pa-
tients could recognize a similar duty between researchers and tissue 
providers. Imposing the requisite duty of care on those obtaining tis-
sues makes intuitive sense, as these researchers or bio-repositories 
interact directly with tissue providers by means of a relationship simi-
lar to the one that exists between physicians and their patients. More-
over, although courts are often hesitant to impose liability for 
dignitary or non-physical injuries,191 they have done so for appropri-
ately circumscribed types of injuries, such as those arising from inva-
sion of privacyl92 and defamation. 193 Particularly in cases in which 
breaches of confidentiality or privacy lead to loss or inability to obtain 
health or life insurance or employment, damages for non-physical, 
economic injuries would likely be awarded. 194 Breach of informed 
Nancy Levit, Ethereal Torts, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 136, 145-46 (1992). Scholars have 
sometimes linked the devaluation of emotional torts to gendered judicial decision-making. 
See, e.g., Martha Chamallas & Linda K. Kerber, Women, Mothers, and the Law of Fright: A 
History, 88 MICH. L. REV. 814, 814-16 (1990); Sandor & Berry, supra, at 1258-59. 
189. See Oberdorfer, supra note 22, at 382. Oberdorfer claims that once tissue is safely 
removed, "no harm can befall the tissue source." Id. However, disclosure of damaging or 
embarrassing information to the tissue provider or third parties may cause significant emo-
tional distress, and the use of tissue samples in unconsented-to projects may inflict a digni-
tary, though not physical, hann. Thus, this statement would be more correct if it stated that 
"no [physical] harm can befall the tissue source." 
190. See, e.g., Alan Meisel, A "Dignitary Tort" as a Bridge Between the Idea of In-
formed Consent and the Law of Informed Consent, 16 LAW MED. & HEALTH CARE 210, 
211-14 (1988); Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the 
Law of Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607. 
191. With respect to injuries not involving physical harm, the Restatement (Second) of 
Torts provides: 
[T]here is no liability where the actor's negligent conduct inflicts only 
emotional distress, without resulting bodily harm or any other inva-
sion of the other's interests. Such emotional distress is important only 
in so far as its existence involves a risk of bodily hann, and as affect-
ing the damages recoverable if bodily harm is sustained. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 313 cm!. a (1965). 
192. See JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR., RICHARD N. PEARSON & JOHN A. SILICIANO, THE 
TORTS PROCESS 741-84 (6th ed. 2003); William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 
389 (1960). 
193. See HENDERSON ET AL., supra note 192, at 695-740. 
194. On genetic discrimination and insurance, see, for example, Richard A. Bomstein, 
Note, Genetic Discrimination, Insurability and Legislation: A Closing of the Legal Loop-
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consent, including unauthorized use of samples, disclosure of identi-
fying information, and even commercialization of tissue products 
without permission, could be similarly circumscribed. 
Where courts are willing to recognize causes of action by tissue 
providers against researchers on the basis of dignitary rights, tort is 
likely to be an important tool for protecting providers' interests. In the 
first instance, as noted above, the law of torts governs in the absence 
of, as well as alongside, other formal legal relationships. This means 
that failure to create a contract or a valid license for tissue use does 
not preclude suit in tort. As a corollary, except where predicated on a 
special relationship giving rise to fiduciary obligations only between 
specific individuals, tort also escapes the strictures of privity, and thus 
courts may impose punishment directly on an injuring party, even 
where that party is a downstream researcher. 195 
This is especially noteworthy for claims involving breach of pri-
vacy. The right to privacy is a right against the world. 196 Thus, claims 
for breach of privacy may be brought against any party that impermis-
sibly obtains or reveals private information, for example, information 
regarding future health status. 197 Moreover, individuals genetically 
holes, 4 J.L. & POL'y 551, 563-68 (1996). On genetic discrimination and employment, see, 
for example. DEP'T OF LABOR ET AL., GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE WORKPLACE 
(1998), http://www.dol.gov/oasamJprograms/history/hermanireports/genetics.htm [hereinaf-
ter GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE WORKPLACE] (reporting on the need for federal legis-
lation protecting against genetic discrimination in the workplace and relating several 
incidents in which individuals lost or were denied employment in reaction to results from 
genetic tests). In at least one instance, an employer used involuntary or unknowing genetic 
screening: 
[E]mployers used genetic screening in the early 1970s to identify Af-
rican Americans who carried a gene mutation for sickle cell anemia. 
Those carrying the gene mutation were denied jobs - even though 
many of them were healthy and would never develop the disease. In 
these cases, genetic screening to identify the sickle cell trait often oc-
curred without the consent of the individuals. 
GENETIC INFORMATION AND THE WORKPLACE, supra. More broadly, a 1989 survey of 400 
firms, conducted by Northwestern National Life Insurance, found that fifteen percent of the 
companies planned, by the year 2000, to screen the genetic status of prospective employees 
and their dependents before making employment offers. Larry Gostin, Genetic Discrimina-
tion: The Use of Genetically Based Diagnostic and Prognostic Tests by Employers and 
Insurers, 17 AM. J.L. & MED. 109, 116 (1991). GINA is designed to prevent these kinds of 
discrimination in employment and health insurance. See Genetic Information Nondiscrimi-
nation Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 881. 
195. On the elimination of the requirement of privity in tort, see Stewart F. Hancock, Jr., 
Meeting the Needs: Fairness. Morality. Creativity and Common Sense, 68 ALB. L. REV. 81, 
90-91 (2004). 
196. See Samuel Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
199 (1890) ("In every such case the individual is entitled to decide whether that which is his 
shall be given to the public."). 
197. See Doe v. High-Tech Inst., Inc., 972 P.2d 1060, 1068 (Colo. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] 
person has a privacy interest in his or her blood sample and in the medical information that 
may be obtained from it. We further conclude that an additional, unauthorized test ... can 
be sufficient to state a claim for relief for intrusion upon seclusion."). But see Doe v. Dyer-
Goode, 566 A.2d 889 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (concluding that unauthorized blood tests could 
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related to tissue providers who are harmed by the release of their rela-
tive's genetic information might also have a viable cause of action for 
breach of privacy - at least insofar as release of such information 
constitutes an invasion of their privacy as well. l98 
Dignitary torts would be unlikely, however, to protect against 
downstream researchers making unauthorized use of tissue. Funda-
mentally, in the absence of an agency relationship, we do not ordinar-
ily enforce tort claims against those who are recipients of the fruits of 
a tort. 199 In most instances, a downstream researcher will only be able 
to make impermissible use of human tissue through the fault - the 
failure to obtain appropriate authorization - of an intermediate actor 
with whom the tissue provider has a direct relationship, such as the 
original procuring researcher or a bio-bank collecting, storing, and 
distributing tissue samples. This intermediate actor would likely be 
the "cheapest cost avoider,,,2oo as this actor could most easily obtain 
appropriate consent and communicate the limitations of that consent 
to others working downstream. Courts are therefore likely to find that 
dignitary injuries other than breach of privacy arising from down-
stream, indirect use lie beyond "the eye of ordinary vigilance.,,201 As 
such, these injuries would not form a valid basis for suit. 
not be considered a privacy invasion because the plaintiff, by consenting to a premarital 
blood test, voluntarily relinquished the blood sample and therefore no longer held the sam-
ple in private seclusion). As these cases demonstrate, courts have not developed a consistent 
doctrine in this domain. See Mark A. Rothstein, Genetic Stalking and Voyeurism: A New 
Challenge to Privacy, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 539, 550 (2009). 
I leave aside here the separate and complicated issue of whether and when a physician -
who is both in privity with a patient and under additional fiduciary obligations - has a duty 
to disclose the results of genetic testing to a patient's immediate family members. See, e.g., 
Safer v. Estate of Pack, 677 A.2d 1188, 1192-93 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1996) (holding 
that a physician had a duty to warn those known to be at risk of avoidable harm from a 
genetically transmissible condition). But see Pate v. Threlkel, 661 So. 2d 278, 282 (Fla. 
1995) (holding that "in any circumstances in which the physician has a duty to warn of a 
genetically transferable disease, that duty will be satisfied by warning the patient"). Suffice 
it to say, where disclosure is to persons other than close genetic relatives - for example, 
researchers, insurers, employers, or the general public (by means of publication) - a duty 
to disclose the results of genetic testing is unlikely to complicate the privacy analysis. 
198. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 6521 cmt. a (1977) (explaining that although 
"[t]he right protected by the action for invasion of privacy is a personal right," an action for 
breach of privacy may be maintained by "other persons such as members of the individual's 
family" where "their own privacy is invaded along with his" (emphasis added)). To my 
knowledge, no such case has yet been brought. 
199. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ch. 2, introductory note (2005) (identifying 
in broad terms the limited domains of law in which one person is held to the legal conse-
quences of another person's action: three bases in agency (actual authority, apparent author-
ity, and respondeat superior), and two doctrines related to agency (estoppel to deny 
existence of an agency relationship and restitution)). 
200. See GUIDO CALABRESl, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS 135-73 (1970). 
201. Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928); see also Moore v. 
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,493 (Cal. 1990) (emphasizing that downstream 
researchers are "innocent parties who are engaged in socially useful activities" and "have no 
reason to believe that their use of a particular cell sample is, or may be, against a donor's 
wishes"). 
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Instead, these injuries, and those arising from indirect claims re-
garding unauthorized copying and distribution of genetic material, are 
more amenable to redress where claims of conversion are available. 
Yet conversion torts must be supported by a property right of some 
sort.202 Tort alone is thus insufficient to protect some ofthe significant 
interests of tissue providers. Rather, tort must be undergirded by some 
system for allocating property rights to the physical cells or the infor-
mation they contain. The informational property model advanced here 
would provide the necessary property right to which tort claims could 
attach. Indeed, informational property rights may be uniquely well-
suited to this task, as these rights would function like a property-like 
corollary to or extension of privacy rights in tort. Both guard the hu-
man dignity of tissue providers by ensuring that these providers have 
control over whether and how the information in their cells is ob-
tained, used, or shared. While privacy torts run primarily to the dis-
closure of genetic and other information, however, informational 
property rights are broader, reaching not only the disclosure of infor-
mation but also its use and, potentially, its commercialization?03 Inte-
grating the informational property approach with traditional tort 
actions thus yields a richer system of protection. 
2. Contract 
"A contract is a promise or a set of promises for the breach of 
which the law gives a remedy, or the performance of which the law in 
some way recognizes as a duty.,,204 Like tort, informed consent is at 
the very heart of contract. "Consent is the master concept that defines 
the law of contracts in the United States.,,205 Where a contract can be 
proven, breach of contract - un consented-to use of tissue, disclosure 
without permission, un shared profits, anonymization without consent 
that deprives patient-providers of the possibility of improved treat-
ment flowing from better understanding of their unique conditions -
is a cognizable injury that may lead to some, if often imperfect, rem-
edy. Although emotional distress is typically not compensable in con-
202. Conversion is defined as "[t]he wrongful possession or disposition of another's 
property as ifit were one's own." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 381 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis 
added). In order for there to be conversion, there must first be property to be converted. 
203. The scope and appropriateness of protection by way of privacy in this arena has been 
the subject of considerable debate. Compare Suter, supra note 74 (arguing that privacy 
provides broad control over genetic information and a more appropriate approach than a 
property rights model), with Anita A. Allen, Privacy-as-Data-Control: Conceptual. Practi-
cal. and Moral Limits of the Paradigm, 32 CONN. L. REV. 861 (2000) (arguing that alterna-
tives to the privacy-as-data-control paradigm are needed). 
204. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § I (1981). 
205. Schuck, supra note 43, at 900. 
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tract remedies,206 rescission (i.e., withdrawal), money damages, in-
junctive relief, or specific performance may be available?07 There-
fore, tissue providers knowledgeable and forthright in asserting their 
interests may be able to bargain for any number of provisions protect-
ing their interests in control, confidentiality, commercialization, or 
cure prospects. 
At least one disease advocacy group has demonstrated the success 
of the contract model for allocating increased control over research 
more equitably as between tissue providers and researchers. PXE In-
ternational, a patient advocacy group for individuals suffering from 
pseudoxanthoma elasticum ("PXE"), a genetic disease, successfully 
negotiated for co-ownership of any patents that resulted from study of 
blood samples collected from PXE patients and their families.20B PXE 
International succeeded because it withheld access to its unique re-
sources until researchers signed specific contracts ensuring that intel-
lectual property rights would be shared?09 By doing so, PXE 
International was able to steer researchers to search for the genetic 
basis of PXE and to retain sufficient control over access to those re-
search results to protect its members' interests. The success of PXE 
International stands for the proposition that, wielded by the right 
hands, contract can work on behalf of tissue providers and researchers 
alike. Such positive experiences within the contract model are likely 
to be few and far between, however, as most individuals face tissue 
provision alone and must contend with sharp disequilibria of informa-
tion and power in the researcher-tissue provider relationship.210 
Tissue providers might also look to informed consent documents 
as contracts establishing the agreement of an individual to participate 
in research. Contracts taking the form of tiered consent could provide 
powerful protection for tissue providers. As explained earlier, tiered 
consent documents present potential tissue providers with a menu of 
206. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (1981) ("Recovery for emotional 
disturbance will be excluded unless the breach also caused bodily harm or the contract or 
the breach is of such a kind that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely 
result."); id. § 353 cmt. a ("Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily al-
lowed."). 
207. Specific performance, like an injunction in tort, is an equitable remedy and that con-
cern for ongoing research may make judges unwilling to grant such discretionary relief. 
208. See Gitter, supra note 24, at 262-63; Paul Smaglik, Tissue Donors Use Their Influ-
ence in Deal over Gene Patent Terms, 407 NATURE 821, 821 (2000). It is possible that, 
even in an environment hostile to tissue providers profiting from their tissue provision, 
PXE's contract would be enforceable because it contracted for rights, rather than for cash 
directly. 
209. To date, neither the researchers who discovered the gene responsible for PXE, nor 
the members of PXE International have challenged the legality of their agreement, and 
therefore its enforceability has not yet been passed on by a court. Gitter, supra note 24, at 
263. 
210. See Bovenberg, supra note 78, at 931-32 (discussing bargaining disequilibria be-
tween researchers and individual tissue providers). 
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research categories to which they may consent.211 Despite their fre-
quent similarity in form to contracts, however, informed consent 
documents, whether tiered or otherwise, are generally not considered 
to be contractual documents.212 
We might conclude upfront that the idea of consent as contract is 
one that should be discouraged. After all, efforts to make informed 
consent documents look more like contracts often yield consent forms 
that are twenty or more pages long and written in highly technical 
language.213 These features can subvert the purpose of the informed 
consent process and the accompanying form by turning consent into 
something so legalistic that the tissue provider does not understand 
what she is consenting to?14 Overly technical or legalistic language 
may also cause tissue providers to believe that consent - and the 
consent form - is less about their own understanding and decision-
making and more about protecting researchers from legalliability.215 
Even if the paradigm of consent-as-contract is one we wish to 
pursue, convincing a court to recognize an informed consent docu-
ment as a contract is likely to be problematic for a number of reasons. 
In the first instance, courts may find a lack of consideration for tissue 
providers, rendering tissue provision a gift rather than an exchange in 
contract.216 To prove a contract, tissue providers must show that they 
derived specific benefits from providing tissue for research that are 
211. See Ram, supra note 156, at 23-24; see also supra notes 156--60 and accompanying 
text. 
212. See Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 674-76 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (holding that the signed consent forms demonstrated the donors' 
intent to make a gift); Richard S. Saver, At the End of the Clinical Trial: Does Access to 
Investigational Technology End As Well?, 31 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 411, 428 (2009) (ob-
serving that some courts have "treat[ ed] the informed consent documents as merely notice 
of the subjects' consent rather than an enforceable contract"); Nat'l Human Genome Re-
search Inst., Informed Consent, http://www.genome.govIl0002332 (last visited Dec. 20, 
2009) ("[T]he informed consent document is not a contract."). But see Dahl v. HEM Pharm. 
Corp., 7 F.3d 1399, 1404-05 (9th Cir. 1993) (interpreting participation in a medical trial as 
a contract); Grimes v. Kennedy Krieger Inst., Inc., 782 A.2d 807, 843-44 (Md. 2001) (find-
ing that the consent form created a bilateral contract between parties). 
213. See Daniel R. Young, Donald T. Hooker & Fred E. Freeberg, Informed Consent 
Documents: Increasing Comprehension by Reducing Reading Level, IRB, May-June 1990, 
at I, 1-2 (noting studies that have found many informed consent documents are written at, 
or above, college reading level); NAT'L CANCER INST., SIMPLIFICATION OF INFORMED 
CONSENT DOCUMENTS (2009), http://www.cancer.gov/clinicaltrials/understanding! 
simplification-of-informed-consent-docs/allpages/print ("Many informed consent docu-
ments have become too long and complex, and do not provide a sound basis for informed 
decision-making."). 
214. See, e.g., Corbie-Smith et aI., Attitudes and Belieft, supra note 46, at 540-41 (identi-
fying difficulties in understanding informed consent documents due to their "technical med-
ical and legal terminology"); James Flory & Ezekiel Emanuel, Interventions to Improve 
Research Participants' Understanding in Informed Consent for Research, 292 JAMA 1593, 
1593 & 1600 nn.5-11 (2004) (collecting sources documenting failure to understand); Young 
et aI., supra note 213, at I. 
215. Corbie-Smith et aI., Attitudes and Belieft, supra note 46, at 540-41. 
216. See Catalona, 490 F .3d at 676. 
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sufficient to constitute consideration. If providers received payments 
for their tissues, this would constitute clear consideration.217 But up-
front financial exchange has, to date, been unpopular and uncom-
mon.218 Alternatively, for patient-providers, who may anticipate that 
research on their tissue will lead to direct as well as indirect medical 
benefit for themselves, consideration may seem fairly concrete. For 
instance, in Catalona, "[t]he informed consent forms signed by each 
participant listed the 'benefits' of the research to 'you and/or society,' 
including 'help in counseling your family members regarding cancer.' 
The participants testified as to the clinical benefits they expected to 
receive from research participation.,,219 Notwithstanding this evi-
dence, however, the Eighth Circuit concluded that rather than creating 
a contract, the tissue providers had made an inter vivos gift of tissue to 
W h· U' . 220 as mgton lllversity. 
For non-patient providers, it is less clear that the intangible bene-
fits of the advance of medical research are sufficient to constitute ade-
quate consideration creating an enforceable contract. 
Moreover, the National Human Genome Research Institute 
("NHGRI"), an arm of the National Institutes of Health, has suggested 
that informed consent documents are not contracts precisely because 
human subjects may "opt out" of participation even after signing such 
documents.221 The fact that tissue providers are often termed tissue 
"donors," and informed consent documents often refer to "donation," 
fu h I· . 222 rt er comp lcates a case m contract. 
Even if a court were willing to recognize an informed consent 
document as some form of a contract, this contract might be unen-
forceable or invalid. In particular, contracts providing payment for 
tissues or lucrative products derived from tissues might be held unen-
217. Cf Grimes, 782 A.2d at 843-44 (recognizing consent fonns as creating a contract in 
part because tbe plaintiffs agreed to participate "with the expectation that they would be 
compensated, albeit, more or less, minimally"). 
218. See Korobkin, supra note 17, at 45-46 (noting the no-compensation default (and in 
some cases immutable no-compensation rule) for tissue providers). 
219. Brief of Appellant-Defendants Richard Ward et al. at 39-40, Wash. Univ. v. Cata-
lona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (Nos. 06-2286 & 06-2301) (internal citations omitted). 
220. Calalona, 490 F.3d at 676. 
221. Nat'! Human Genome Research Inst., supra note 212 ("Even after signing, tbe pa-
tient may still opt out of the test or study; the infonned consent document is not a con-
tract."). The NHGRI's statements suggest tbat if infonned consent is treated as a contract, 
then any attempt to withdraw tissue from research use would constitute a breach for which 
the witbdrawing tissue provider would be liable. This is not necessarily so, as parties are 
free to contract for any desired provisions, so long as tbey are not against public policy. 
Tissue providers and researchers could include a unilateral right to withdraw in tbe contract 
for tissue provision. That this is unlikely to occur, given the imbalance of authority and 
power in favor of tbe researcher in any provider-researcher interaction, is an interesting, but 
not law-changing, observation. 
222. See Calalona, 490 F.3d at 671, 674 (emphasizing "donation" language). 
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forceable as against public policy.223 Courts may also be disinclined to 
enforce contracts that attempt to sharply limit the use of tissue in re-
search?24 Society has a significant interest in promoting research, and 
limitations on tissue use that substantially interfere with ongoing re-
search or impose considerable transaction costs on researchers may be 
considered as against public policy. In fact, this same interest in the 
progress of science may expose overzealous contracting for tissue 
provision as diminishing the tissue provider's own interests. Too 
many different details to track across thousands or millions of samples 
will inevitably slow research and may make it prohibitively expensive 
to conduct and monitor.225 This last problem may be largely addressed 
through the use of a tiered consent process, which aims to limit the 
variety of different details that must be tracked within the consent-
contract system. Yet, tiered-consent-as-contract suffers from most of 
the other shortcomings of consent-as-contract generally. Tiered con-
sent documents fare no better than traditional consent documents, for 
instance, where problems of consideration, unacceptable commer-
cialization, or overly restrictive contracting exist. 
Nor is it clear whether a valid contract (tiered or otherwise) be-
tween a tissue provider and a tissue procurer is enforceable against 
downstream researchers who violate the terms of the informed con-
sent contract. Here, a lack of privity makes suit against a downstream 
third-party difficult to prove?26 Tort (especially in instances of breach 
223. Gitter, supra note 24, at 263-64 & n.30 (opining that adherence to a market-
inalienability model might render a contract like PXE International's void as against public 
policy). 
224. But cf Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1072 (S.D. Fla. 2003). The Greenberg court permitted plaintiff tissue providers to 
pursue their claim of unjust enrichment - a quasi-contractual claim - based on an alleged 
detriment arising from unauthorized use of the disputed tissue. [d. This suggests that con-
tractual arrangements restricting the use of tissue or genetic information may be consistent 
with public policy. The Greenberg court, however, also noted that the relationship between 
plaintiffs and researchers was "more than just a donor-donee relationship." Id. If something 
more than an ordinary "donor-donee relationship" is required, then many tissue providers 
are likely to be excluded from recovery on this basis. 
225. See JOHN WILBANKS & JAMES BOYLE, SCIENCE COMMONS, INTRODUCTION TO 
SCIENCE COMMONS 9 (2006), http://sciencecommons.org/wp-contentluploads/ 
ScienceCommons_Concept_Paper.pdf ("A complex set of interlocking licenses covering 
dozens of different materials imposes significant transaction costs simply to gain the oppor-
tunity to begin research .... The end result benefits no one - less research, less innova-
tion, less diffusion of knowledge."). 
226. On the relationship between privity, contract, and third-party liability, see Andrew 
L. Weitz, Note, Contractor Duty to Third Parties Not in Privity: A Quasi-Tort Solution to 
the Vexing Problem of Victims of Nonfeasance, 63 BROOK. L. REV. 593, 602-04 (1997). 
Lack of privity is dispositive when the issue is one of liability in con-
tract to third parties. This is so because there is, by definition, no duty 
owed to a plaintiff who is neither a party to a contract nor an intended 
third party beneficiary who is a victim of a contractor's nonfeasance, 
unless such a duty is specifically undertaken by a defendant. 
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of privacy) or free-standing property claims of some kind will often 
better serve the tissue provider in these situations. 
Moreover, principles of contract offer little guidance in instances 
in which tissue is used in research without any explicit authorization 
from the tissue provider. Such use is not uncommon, given that many 
tissue samples are obtained during routine medical exams and are ap-
propriated for research purposes without any research consent being 
obtained.227 One way to treat these situations would be to hold that no 
contract exists. Contracts arise only where there is a mutual intent to 
create them.228 Under this interpretation, where individuals are made 
tissue providers without their knowledge, there can be no requisite 
intent. In these instances, principles of contract provide little in the 
way of instruction or remedy. Rather, remedy must come through tort, 
property, or some other regime. 
Alternatively, because the use of cell and tissue samples in re-
search without consent is commonplace, such use may be viewed as 
governed by an implied contract. In this case, individuals accepting 
medical treatment, and the cell/tissue extraction that may accompany 
it, would likewise implicitly assent to the use of their cells for re-
search. Without further specificity, such an implied contract would 
have no limits, except those imposed by statute or general public pol-
icy concerns. This outcome is distressing, since it could impinge on 
individuals' willingness to seek medical care out of concerns relating 
to the control, confidentiality, and commercialization of their genetic 
material.229 
Thus, where a court will recognize and enforce a contract, tissue 
providers may hold significant power in the researcher-provider rela-
tionship to exercise their interests, particularly against those who pro-
cured their original consent. However, the presence of an enforceable 
contract is not clear even when explicit informed consent or other 
documents are in use. Nor are principles of contract sufficient to ad-
dress the harms perpetrated by unconsented-to acquisition and use of 
tissue in research. Contract thus provides insufficient protection for 
key interests of tissue providers, while also opening the possibility of 
damage to both tissue providers' and society's interest in supporting 
ongoing research. 
[d. at 603. Weitz observes that, at least in New York, where a contract exists between two 
parties, tort liability to third parties is determined by contract liability such that privity re-
enters the tort equation. [d. at 603-04. 
227. WEIR & OLICK, supra note 81, at 169. 
228. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 & cmt. c (1981)(identifying "mutual 
assent" or "agreement" as a core element of contract formation). The Restatement recog-
nizes a number of exceptions to this rule, in which contracts can be formed in the absence of 
a bargain. [d. §§ 17(2), 82-94. 
229. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 52, at 7; Rapp, supra note 47, at 49 (noting a 
female patient who refused an amniocentesis during her pregnancy after her husband re-
viewed the consent form). 
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3. Property 
Assignment of property rights to tissue can be critical in resolving 
conflicts between tissue providers and researchers. Where tissue pro-
viders retain a property interest in tissue samples, these providers gen-
erally have the right to exclude unwanted acquisition or use of their 
tissues. However, if tissue providers do not have a property interest in 
cells once they are removed from the body, then tissue providers may 
be powerless to prevent the use of their tissue in any way. In contrast 
to the informational property model discussed in Part lILA, however, 
the property model considered here extends only to interests protected 
and incentives shaped by the assignment of a right to the physical 
cells obtained through tissue extraction. 
Property is often described as a "bundle of rights" that may be 
exercised with respect to a particular object.23o These rights generally 
include "the rights to possess the property, to use the property, to ex-
clude others from the property, and to dispose of the property by sale 
or by gift.,,231 The Supreme Court has recognized that the right to ex-
clude is "one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that 
are commonly characterized as property.,,232 Thus, if courts recognize 
tissue providers as the holders of such a bundle of rights in their tissue 
samples, then any unauthorized use, disclosure, or commercialization 
of tissue would be actionable as a violation of property rights. Courts 
adjudicating disputes between tissue providers and researchers might 
require defendant-researchers to compensate plaintiff-tissue-providers 
whose interests were injured or to refrain from making further use of 
the tissue sample in ~uestion, no matter what cost or burden this might 
place on researchers. 33 Indeed, even in the absence of compensatory 
damages, punitive damage awards designed to punish defendants and 
230. E.g., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979) (describing "property" 
as comprising a "bundle of rights"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (9th ed. 2009) (rec-
ognizing that "property" is "[a]lso termed bundle o/rights"). Furthering the analogy, rights 
associated with property are often termed "sticks," such that the Court may make statements 
like "[t]he State may not put so potent a Hobbesian stick into the Lockean bundle." Palaz-
zolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 627 (2001); see also Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176. 
231. Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479,509 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, 1., dis-
senting). 
232. Kaiser Aetna, 444 U.S. at 176. 
233. Real property (i.e., land) is often protected by the strongest forms of property right 
protection, even when the costs of such protection greatly exceed the individualized benefits 
derived from such protection. See Pile v. Pedrick, 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895) (requiring Pedrick to 
remove a wall built in good faith entirely on his own property, the foundation of which 
accidentally extended one and a half inches onto Pile's property). Although it is by no 
means clear that we should desire that human tissue be treated in ways similar to real prop-
erty, these kinds of cases indicate the strong protection that property law can offer. 
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compensate plaintiffs for non-physical injury to their interests may be 
. d 234 Impose. 
Private property rights to the physical cells used in research may 
also give rise to a right to withdraw tissue from research use, so long 
as that right is bargained for in the original transfer of property. Much 
as in contract, tort, and informational property, informed consent can 
play an important role in protecting the interests of the tissue pro-
vider - in property, we might think of informed consent documents 
as memorializing a bailmenf35 or establishing a deed governing trans-
fer of property. A right to withdraw could be accomplished by the 
creation of an arrangement analogous to a fee simple determinable?36 
Under this kind of property transfer, the recipient of property - in 
this case, the researcher - holds a property right to the cells so long 
as they are used in accordance with any specific purposes and restric-
tions laid out in the informed consent documents. If any material pro-
vision is violated, the property right reverts to the original 
titleholder - in this case, the tissue provider - who could then de-
mand that the tissue be destroyed.237 
The power to establish and enforce such an arrangement, how-
ever, is likely to be limited by the doctrine disfavoring restraints on 
alienation.238 Indeed, even if courts are willing to recognize that tissue 
providers have a property right in their tissue samples, tissue provid-
ers may be prohibited from imposing more than minimal restrictions 
on researchers. Among the most important reasons for disfavoring 
restraints on alienation is that such restraints diminish incentives to 
234. See Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W. 2d 154, 163 (Wis. 1997) (affirming 
punitive damages of $100,000 where defendant intentionally trespassed on plaintiffs land 
after being repeatedly refused access and where only nominal damages of one dollar were 
otherwise available). At least one property textbook has similarly linked the theoretical 
strands of Jacque and property in the body. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, 
PROPERTY 99-101 (5th ed. 2002) (excerpting Jacque in the notes following the Moore 
case). 
235. But see Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 
128 S. Ct. 1122 (2008) (holding that consent documents do not necessarily create a bail-
ment). 
236. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF PROP. § 44 (1936) (defining a fee simple determinable as 
an estate "created by any limitation which, in an otherwise effective conveyance ofland, (a) 
creates an estate in fee simple; and (b) provides that the estate shall automatically expire 
upon the occurrence of a stated event"). 
237. The Eighth Circuit, during oral arguments in the appeal of the Catalano case, ques-
tioned both appellants and respondents about precisely this kind of property right. Audio 
File of Oral Argument, Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667 (8th Cir. 2007) (No. 06-
2286), http://www.ca8.uscourts.gov/oralargs/oa_Bycs.html(search "06-2286"; then click 
"play" to listen) (last visited Dec. 20, 2009). Alternatively, tissue providers might create a 
fee simple subject to executory interest, in which the original recipient's breach of a mate-
rial provision of the fee simple would trigger the automatic transfer of the fee to a third 
party, presumably another researcher or institution. 
238. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 234, at 227-28 (describing reasons for disfa-
voring restraints on alienation of property and the Restatement of Property's treatment of 
such restraints). 
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improve the property?39 In the context of human tissue research, the 
"dead hand" problem would manifest as a disincentive to invest effort 
in research from which vital tissue samples may be withdrawn or from 
which profit may be restricted. As with cases involving real property, 
the movement and use of human tissue in research is considered a 
public good,240 and courts might therefore be inclined to invalidate 
significant restraints on such tissue (restraints on use, disclosure, 
commercial gain, or forced identifiability for cure) as against public 
policy.241 Courts faced with suits regarding human tissue research 
have appealed to precisely this logic. The court in Greenberg, for ex-
ample, declined to extend the duty of informed consent to cover eco-
nomic interests because imposing such a duty "would give rise to a 
type of dead-hand control.,,242 
Public policy may also enter into the property calculus by remov-
ing certain rights from the bundle attached to a particular type of pri-
vate property. The fact that an individual has a private property right 
in her cells does not mean that she may make any use of her body (or 
its parts) that she wishes?43 As Justice Mosk, dissenting in Moore, 
pointed out: 
For a variety of policy reasons, the law limits or even 
forbids the exercise of certain rights over certain 
forms of property. For example, both law and con-
tract may limit the right of an owner of real property 
to use his parcel as he sees fit. Owners of various 
forms of personal property may likewise be subject 
to restrictions on the time, place, and manner of their 
use. Limitations on the disposition of real property, 
while less common, may also be imposed. Finally, 
some types of personal property may be sold but not 
given away, while others may be given away but not 
sold, and still others may neither be given away nor 
sold?44 
239. Jd. at 227. 
240. See NAT'L BIOETHICS ADVISORY COMM'N, supra note 6, at 9 (identifying that "re-
search use of human biological materials is essential to the advancement of science and 
human health" as a "basic premise" underlying its analysis). 
241. More often, courts simply refuse to recognize tissue providers' property interest in 
their tissue, and so need not consider whether restraints placed on tissue use in research are 
valid. 
242. Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 
1071 (S.D. Fla. 2003); see also id. at 1070, 1 076 (dismissing both a claim of failure to ob-
tain informed consent and a claim of conversion due in part to concerns about "chill[ing]" or 
"crippl[ing]" medical research). 
243. See Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479 (Cal. 1990) (Mosk, J., dis-
senting); Radin, supra note 27. 
244. Moore, 793 P.2d at 509-10 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Most often, in the context of human tissue, public policy will place 
restraints on how and by whom tissue may be used for commercial 
gain, thus giving rise to property that is market-inalienable or inalien-
able in its entirety?45 In addition, public policy concerns may dictate 
that certain uses of tissue are not permitted, as when an individual 
wishes her tissue to be used for unethical or illegal ends. 
Yet, even if private property rights were to extend to human tis-
sue samples with all the trappings of the full bundle of rights, rules of 
property would be insufficient to protect the interests of tissue provid-
ers in a number of critical aspects. For instance, a private property 
right would not likely extend to products derived from tissue samples. 
Common law principles of private property have sometimes recog-
nized independent title in derivative or downstream products. For ex-
ample, crops that have been harvested on rented land are considered 
the personal property of the tenant farmer, rather than the landlord, 
even though the crops drew on the natural resources of the rented land 
in growing?46 Likewise, cell lines are considered sufficiently new 
products into which independent effort and intellect have been in-
vested and to which independent title may be asserted.247 The Moore 
court, for example, rejected John Moore's claim to a property right in 
the cell line derived from his tissue because the cell line represented a 
"product of 'human ingenuity. ",248 This "inventive effort" rendered 
the cell line distinct from the original cells, which merely constituted 
"naturally occurring organisms.,,249 Unlike the operation of natural 
cell division, which does not include a sufficient independent and 
creative effort to give rise to independent title, the cultivation of a cell 
line requires a purposeful human intervention and produces a funda-
mental change in the physical nature of the cells at issue. The genetic 
information available in a mass of tissue and a subsequent cell line 
may be similar in material ways, but their physical identities - the 
245. See Radin, supra note 27. 
246. See, e.g., Haldeman v. Wyo. Farm Loan Bd., 32 F.3d 469, 471 (lOth Cir. 1994) 
("Once severed from the land, crops become personal property."). Note that immature crops 
still growing at the time a leasehold expires are considered the property of the lessor. Id. ("A 
common law rule of real property is that unmatured crops which continue to draw suste-
nance from the soil pass with title to the land unless specifically reserved."); cf Taylor v. 
Newcomb, 82 N.W. 519 (Mich. 1900) (describing ownership rules for manure produced on 
tenanted farm lands that conclude that the product of the leased land belongs to the lessee). 
247. See, e.g., Greenberg v. Miami Children's Hosp. Research Inst., Inc., 264 F. Supp. 2d 
1064, 1076 (S.D. Fla. 2003) ("Plaintiffs claim that the fruits of the research, namely the 
patented material, was commercialized. This is an important distinction and another step in 
the chain of attenuation that renders conversion liability inapplicable to the facts as al-
leged."); Moore, 793 P.2d at 492 ("[T]he subject matter of the Regents' patent - the pat-
ented cell line and the products derived from it - cannot be Moore's property. This is 
because the patented cell line is both factually and legally distinct from the cells taken from 
Moore's body."). 
248. Moore, 793 P.2d at 492. 
249.Id. at 492-93. 
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matter to which private property rights attach - are significantly and 
sufficiently different. 
This approach makes some sense, as much research depends on 
the creation and patenting of products derived from the original cells. 
For courts and other bodies desiring to encourage socially useful ac-
tivity, such as human tissue research and the development of cell lines 
and other derivative products, granting independent title in down-
stream products may appear to provide the right incentives for inven-
tion. Independent title recognizes that the resulting product constitutes 
a new and distinct item of property. Independent title, however, may 
also sever a resulting cell line from any limitations on the use of the 
original tissue sample. This disjunction between valuable information 
and physical continuity also arises where a genetic sequence is de-
rived from a physical cell and then stored digitally?50 These arrange-
ments thus provide a strong incentive for researchers to create 
derivative products, such as cell lines or DNA databases, from tissue 
samples. These products ensure not only that the information in par-
ticular cells will endure, but also that this information will be avail-
able for research use independent of any limitations a tissue provider 
may have placed on the original cells. 
Property principles also provide little recourse for those whom 
courts construe as having abandoned their property. When property is 
abandoned, the former title-holder surrenders any right to the object in 
question, and title is assigned to the first person who takes posses-
sion - the rule of finders keepers.251 To put a finer point on it, cells 
that are considered abandoned property may be used without permis-
sion for any purpose - including privacy-invading ones.252 Hair and 
dead skin cells that are lost from the body in daily life are abandoned 
property, and there is good reason to believe that this logic extends to 
tissue removed from the body during routine medical treatment. As 
Lori Andrews observes, "the principle most commonly applied seems 
to be that of 'finders keepers' where pathologists, physicians, and re-
searchers who have access to patient tissue feel no qualms about keep-
ing it for their own use, beyond the purposes for which the tissue was 
250. Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 8. In arguing for the non-patentability of genetic in-
formation stored in computer-readable format, Eisenberg acknowledges that "[t]he distinc-
tion between computer-readable and molecular versions of DNA sequence is particularly 
difficult to maintain in the context of DNA array technology." ld. at 9. This statement ad-
mits that the physical form of genetic-sequence information is largely irrelevant to its value 
or usefulness. As a matter of property law, however, that distinction makes all the differ-
ence. 
251. DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 234, at 120. 
252. Police officers have taken advantage of abandoned DNA to obtain genetic profiles 
of criminal suspects, free of the strictures of ordinary criminal procedure rules. See Eliza-
beth E. Joh, Reclaiming "Abandoned" DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic Privacy, 
100 Nw. U. L. REv. 857, 859 (2006). 
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collected.,,253 Cell samples obtained during routine interactions with 
medical or research personnel are classified as waste material once 
their clinical purpose is complete,254 and waste material is sure to be 
considered abandoned property. Indeed, the fact that excised cells 
must be classified as waste material when not being used for treatment 
and research has been a primary reason why courts have traditionally 
refused to recognize that tissue providers have any enduring property 
interest in their cell samples.255 
In contrast to these shortcomings, an informational property re-
gime goes further to protect against unwanted use of cells that have 
been abandoned or transformed. Informational property rights, like 
the intellectual property rights on which they are modeled, are dura-
ble. Although a copyright holder may freely give her creation to the 
public domain, she cannot lose her copyright through unconscious 
abandonment during the statutory period?56 Under an informational 
property model, personal, unique genetic information would therefore 
be unavailable for use in research without a license, no matter how or 
from where it was obtained. Moreover, informational property rights 
would persist even in derivative products like DNA databases - in 
which no physical cell remains - because the genetic information 
being stored is identical (or nearly so) to that of the original cells.257 
Informational property could therefore succeed where traditional 
property claims have thus far failed. 
253. Andrews, supra note 20, at 23. 
254. See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1030 (2008) (defining "Regulated Waste" as including "[aJny 
unfixed tissue or organ (other than intact skin) from a human (living or dead)"); Interna-
tional Center for Alternatives in Research and Education, Human Tissue Banks, 
http://www.icare-worldwide.orglresearchlindex.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2009) (noting 
that surgery tissue surplus is currently disposed of as sanitary waste). A number of states 
have promulgated provisions designating human tissue as waste. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & 
SAFETY CODE § 7054.4 (Deering Supp. 2009) ("Notwithstanding any other provision of 
law, recognizable anatomical parts, human tissues, anatomical human remains, or infectious 
waste following conclusion of scientific use shall be disposed of by interment, incineration, 
or any other method determined by the state department [of health services] to protect the 
public health and safety."). 
255. As the Catalona court observed: 
Noticeably absent from the record is any mention the [research par-
ticipantsJ ever were informed they could physically withdraw or re-
quest the return of their biological samples. Indeed, in no event could 
the samples physically be returned to their donors. Federal and state 
regulations prohibit such a result by defining excised body tissue and 
blood as hazardous substances or infectious waste, and by articulating 
the proper disposal method. 
Wash. Univ. v. Catalona, 490 F.3d 667, 676 (8th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct. 1122 
(2008); see also Moore v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 491-92 (Cal. 1990) 
(discussing how Moore's claim of a continuing property interest in his excised cells is un-
dermined by California health and safety codes regulating the disposal of human tissue). 
256. See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2006). 
257. As discussed supra note 128, informational property, unlike the private property 
model discussed in this Part, would also extend to cell lines materially similar to the tissue 
provider'S cells from which they were derived. 
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IV. ASSIGNING RIGHTS To PROTECT INTERESTS 
An informational property model provides a more complete ap-
proach for protecting the interests of tissue providers and satisfying 
the needs of researchers than tort, contract, or traditional property 
alone. The informational property model assigns an enduring prop-
erty-like right to the stuff in cells that is most likely to be used in ways 
that raise issues about control, confidentiality, commercialization, and 
even cure. Significantly, informational property rights bind both 
downstream and direct users of the tissue in ways that contract and 
private property models cannot. Except in the context of privacy 
rights, even tort is limited in its ability to reach downstream users ab-
sent a special duty of care. Formulated as an open source, copyleft, 
tiered consent licensing system limited by a fair utilization exception, 
informational property rights also ensure that research is able to pro-
ceed without over-burdensome transaction costs. In particular, a tiered 
consent system modeled on Creative Commons licensing minimizes 
transaction costs because research categories can be somewhat stan-
dardized and therefore efficiently tracked without any need to refer to 
external identifiers. 
Informational property rights alone, however, are likely to yield 
an incomplete governance regime. Tort supplies most of the remain-
ing portion.258 Tort-imposed duties of care are needed to give form 
and substance to what is required in obtaining informed consent and 
appropriate licensing.259 In so doing, tort should recognize researchers 
as fiduciaries to their tissue providers?60 Ethical informed consent is a 
process demanding not only disclosure, but also understanding. Tort is 
the system of law that can best set standards that will require such a 
process rather than simply a signature on a piece of paper. In addition 
to recognizing the fiduciary duty of informed consent required of re-
258. As previously explained, a contract is insufficiently protective in most instances be-
cause, among other things, it effectively puts the burden of initiating negotiation on the 
tissue providers, who will almost always be the less-informed and less-powerful bargaining 
partner. Recognizing private property rights in human tissue is no more helpful, as property 
rights will inadequately protect individuals from the unconsented-to use of cells sloughed 
off during everyday life. 
259. Tort already performs this role in the context of informed consent for medical treat-
ment, where existing tort doctrine establishes what constitutes sufficient substance and 
process to yield legally valid consent. See supra notes 179-181 and accompanying text. 
Where an informational property system establishes a duty that researchers obtain informed 
consent licenses from tissue providers, tort may playa crucial role in defining what that 
duty entails - what constitutes the exercise of reasonable care or what qualifies as suffi-
ciently informed consent. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 4 (1965) 
(explaining that the word "duty" denotes that one is "required to conduct himself in a par-
ticular manner at the risk that if he does not do so he becomes subject to liability to another 
to whom the duty is owed for any injury sustained by such other, of that which the actor's 
conduct is a legal cause"). 
260. Cf notes 184-185 and accompanying text. 
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searchers, tort should likewise impose a fiduciary duty on bio-
repositories as these establishments become more central to the proc-
ess of collecting, maintaining, and distributing tissue for research. 
Together, informational property rights supported by tort-enforced 
duties of care act as penalty defaults against researchers and bio-
repositories who would otherwise seek unrestricted access to tissues 
by providing minimal or no information during the consent process.261 
Tort is also needed to play an ongoing, critical role in protecting 
individuals from collection of tissue samples without consent where 
tissue is to be used as a raw material for research, rather than as a 
source of genetic information. Neither informational nor traditional 
property rights provide sufficient protection in these instances, and the 
law of contracts offers no protection where no contract has been cre-
ated. 
Although future scientific findings may provide a basis for ex-
tending informational property rights to non-genetic cellular research, 
an informational property system would at present yield little protec-
tion for this kind of research. Informed consent and control nonethe-
less remain critical, as, for example, women who do not want their 
enucleated eggs to be used in cloning research likely have a strong 
interest in preventing such use. In these instances, reliance on explicit 
contracts (where possible) and general torts requiring informed con-
sent for tissue collection may be needed to fill this gap. 
Finally, tort is required for setting the baseline for what privacy 
and confidentiality controls must protect. Tort identifies what reason-
able expectations of privacy should be and imposes liability on those 
researchers or other actors who fall short of these expectations. More-
over, tort liability can attach even if the tortfeasor is not in privity 
with the injured party, as when a downstream researcher breaches 
tissue providers' privacy or when any researcher breaches the privacy 
of a tissue provider's close genetic relatives.262 Yet tort doctrines will 
not unnecessarily define precisely what methods must be used to pro-
tect tissue provider confidentiality. This is as it should be - techno-
logical innovations in coding samples can and should provide the 
means for protecting privacy, while tort defends the end goal of suffi-
cient confidentiality. Indeed, an interactive system of tort obligations 
and informational property rights (and, in particular, appropriate 
methods of informational rights management) protects interests not 
only in control and confidentiality, but also in the health benefits of 
human tissue research. Where confidentiality is guarded by tort-
enforced baselines and protected by technological advances in coding, 
261. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in incomplete Contracts: An Eco-
nomic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) (proposing penalty default rules 
in contract as information-forcing mechanisms). 
262. See supra notes 195-97 and accompanying text. 
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tissue providers can reap the benefits of research that can, if neces-
sary, be linked back to identifiable individuals without fearing that 
such identification will be routine, intrusive, or damaging. In drawing 
on the strengths of more than one set of legal rules, we can construct a 
regime that both protects and encourages. 
The strengths of any particular system are less clear when consid-
ering interests in commercialization. None of the models discussed in 
this Article is well suited to identifying a specific set of rules for pro-
tecting the commercialization interests of tissue providers, especially 
considering that all may be limited by public policy demands. Each 
model can be applied to any type of human tissue research, meaning 
that no model provides a bright line for distinguishing when tissue 
providers should be permitted to share in the profits of human tissue 
research using their cells and when financial remuneration should be 
prohibited. Owing to the lack of clear guidance on the issue of com-
mercialization, this Article declines to advocate for a specific policy 
on this point. Instead, the crucial issue of ethical financial induce-
ments and rewards in human tissue research is reserved for further 
exploration elsewhere. 
One final inquiry remains: feasibility. Convincing courts to adopt 
a sui generis set of informational property rights would be extremely 
difficult, and vested interests in unencumbered access to research ma-
terials might suggest that legislative and regulatory efforts are 
unlikely to succeed.263 Yet, it may well be that sui generis rights are 
unnecessary. The current legal regime does not formally recognize the 
sort of informational property rights that are integral to creating an 
effective and ethical research enterprise - but the seeds of such pro-
tection do exist. 
For instance, under the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act ("UAGA"), 
which has been adopted in some form by all fifty states, individuals 
may stipulate that their organs be directed to a particular recipient. 264 
This suggests that policy makers in all fifty states are aware of the 
important relationships that exist between persons, bodies, and body 
parts. Moreover, the Common Rule provides that informed consent 
263. See Eisenberg, supra note 127, at 10 (suggesting that the biotechnology industry op-
erates on well-entrenched and precedent-based expectations); Ossorio, supra note 136, at 
427 (contrasting "the well-focused and clearly articulated financial interests of the biotech-
nology industry" with "the diffuse and difficult-to-articulate social and moral interests of the 
world's majority"). 
264. See UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § I I (a)(2) (amended 2006), 8A U.L.A. 84 (Supp. 
2009). The UAGA was first promulgated in 1968. By 1973, all fifty states and the District 
of Columbia had adopted it in some form. Tanya K. Hernandez, The Property of Death, 60 
U. PITI. L. REV. 971,1022 (1999). The UAGA was revised in 1986 and again in 2006. For a 
recent list of states that have adopted or proposed the Revised UAGA (2006), see Uniform 
Law Commissioners, A Few Facts About The Revised Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(2006), http://www.nccusl.orglupdate/uniformactJactsheets/uniformacts-fs-uaga.asp (last 
visited Dec. 20, 2009). 
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may not include exculpatory language waiving, or appearing to waive, 
a research participant's legal rights,z65 Official guidance interpreting 
this provision identifies impermissible exculpatory language, includ-
ing clauses waiving "any property rights I may have in bodil6' fluids 
or tissue samples obtained in the course of the research.,,26 These 
provisions establish that regulatory rules already exist by which some 
provider rights could be protected. 
Finally, the recent enactment of the Genetic Information Nondis-
crimination Act ("GINA,,)267 demonstrates Congress's understanding 
of the importance of genetic information. GINA may serve as a first 
step in a larger legislative, regulatory, and judicial project that em-
braces the recognition of informational property rights in genetic in-
formation. Thus, although instituting informational property rights 
demands creative thinking about the nature of the rights inherent in 
genetic information and human tissue, the foundation for such rights 
is well laid. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Respect for and protection of the interests of tissue providers, re-
searchers, and society at large is necessary if human tissue research is 
to proceed in an ethical and effective manner. If the interests of tissue 
providers are given short shrift in an attempt to facilitate research, a 
significant number of potential tissue providers will simply refuse to 
participate. Some may even avoid necessary health care out of con-
cern about the subsequent research use of their tissue.268 Research 
may suffer for lack of truly population-wide sampling and perhaps 
even an overall dearth of available samples. On the other hand, if on-
erous transaction costs are imposed on researchers working with hu-
man tissue samples or if the commercial gains of such research are too 
far diminished by tissue providers' claims on profits, then investment 
in research may fall and, with it, the benefits flowing from such re-
search. 
In exploring possible legal models for resolving disputes between 
tissue providers and researchers, several things have become clear. 
The nature of human tissue research demands a legal regime that will 
bind both downstream and direct users of tissue samples. Of the four 
models considered, informational property rights offer the most robust 
265.45 C.F.R. § 46.116 (2008). 
266. Office for Prot. from Research Risks, "Exculpatory Language" in Informed Consent 
(Nov. 15, 1996), http://www.hhs.gov/ohrplhumansubjects/guidance/exculp.htm (providing 
guidance about what constitutes exculpatory language prohibited by the Common Rule 
regulations). 
267. Genetic Information Nondiscrimination Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-233, 122 Stat. 
881. 
268. See Nelkin & Andrews, supra note 52, at 7; Rapp, supra note 47, at 49. 
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and enduring protection of tissue providers' control interests. This 
occurs only when these rights are formulated appropriately (as open 
source, copyleft, tiered consent licensing, possibly limited by a fair 
utilization exception) and are supported by tort-enforced duties of care 
giving substance to the meaning of consent. 
Moreover, tort is uniquely well suited to punish direct as well as 
downstream users for unauthorized breaches of confidentiality. While 
informational property rights, information rights management, and 
technologies for coding and databasing samples provide tools for pro-
tecting identifiable information linking specific samples to specific 
individuals, tort is needed to fix the baseline for what constitutes ade-
quate protection of tissue provider privacy. Thus, protecting the inter-
ests of tissue providers and researchers in human tissue research 
demands a mixed legal regime, drawing not only on tort (as the cur-
rent legal regime suggests), but also on informational property rights 
(the seeds for which already exist, but which the current legal regime 
does not formally recognize). A great deal is at stake in governing 
human tissue research, and creating the right mix of legal rights and 
obligations is a critical step in that governance. 
